Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX
Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does
Sandoval or Sullivan Control This Question?
Bradford C. Mank∗

INTRODUCTION
Recently, the federal circuit courts of appeals have divided in
addressing to what extent either Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1
1964 (hereinafter “Title VI”) or Title IX of the Education
2
Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter “Title IX”) protects those who
complain about racial or gender discrimination from retaliation by
3
their employers or schools. Title VI prohibits federal agencies from
providing funding to any person, organization, or governmental
4
agency that discriminates on the basis of race. Similarly, Title IX
∗
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42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-4a (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). Title IX provides that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 1681(a); see Derek
Black, Comment, Picking up the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private
Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 377 n.148 (2002).
3
Compare Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff
can sue for retaliation under Title VI), with Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309
F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under
Title IX), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004). See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672, 2003 WL
22428035 (S. Ct. May 13, 2003) [hereinafter “Cert. Petition”] (arguing that there is a
split in circuits requiring Supreme Court review of Jackson); infra notes 16-27 and
accompanying text, and Part IV.
4
Section 601 of the statute provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see generally
Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 23-25 (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
1999); James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 152-55 (1994).
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prohibits gender discrimination in federally funded educational
programs and activities. Title IX “was modeled after Title VI . . .
which is parallel to Title IX except that it prohibits race
discrimination, not sex discrimination, and applies in all programs
5
receiving federal funds, not only in education programs.” Because
of the similarities between these two statutes, federal courts have
often examined them together when interpreting their respective
6
meanings.
Neither Title VI nor Title IX explicitly provides for a private
7
right of action, but courts have interpreted both statutes to authorize
8
private suits for plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination. In
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which is limited to government actors, Title VI
reaches private actors who are recipients of federal funds. Pamela S. Karlen,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 196 n.83 (2003). In its
Title VI Manual, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides helpful definitions of
the terms “recipient” and “beneficiary.” A recipient receives grants or funding from
a federal funding agency. The recipient usually is a state or local government agency
that serves as an intermediary for receiving monies from the federal government that
it then ultimately provides to individual beneficiaries. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 20-28 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf [hereinafter “Title VI Manual”];
Jonathan M.H. Short, “Something of a Sport:” The Effect of Sandoval on Title IX Disparate
Impact Discrimination Suits, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 119, 119 n.5 (2002); Colopy,
supra, at 154; The ultimate individual beneficiaries are exempt from Title VI. See id.
5
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998); Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979) (stating that Title IX was modeled
after Title VI); Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012,
1015 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational
Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts have consistently held the
[Title IX] language of Cannon to be applicable in discussions of Title VI.”); 118
CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Black, supra note 2, at 377 n.151,
381 n.184; Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 nn.140-41; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a
Private Cause of Action Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28-29
(1999) (discussing Cannon’s explicit reliance on Title VI cases to interpret Title IX)
[hereinafter Mank, Private Cause]; Short, supra note 4, at 119-20 (observing that Title
IX and Title VI share many similarities, but some differences as well); see also
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (using Title IX case, Cannon, to
interpret Title VI); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984) (stating that the
congressional intent behind Title VI and Title IX was the same); infra notes 10, 7581, 112, 121-26, 249 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 10, 75-81, 89-90, 112, 121-26, 128-30, 139, 249 and accompanying
text.
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88; Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker:
Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551, 554 (2003).
8
See, e.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (recognizing that Title VI provides private
right of action for intentional discrimination); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288-92 (stating that,
in Title IX cases, monetary damages are appropriate under either Title VI or Title IX
where recipient of federal funding has knowledge of intentional discrimination by
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9

Cannon v. University of Chicago, the United States Supreme Court
stated that “[w]e have no doubt that Congress intended to create
Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and
that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of
10
action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.” However, in
11
Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court in 2001 held that there is
no implied private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations
prohibiting recipients from engaging in disparate impact
12
discrimination.
An important question left unanswered by Sandoval is whether a
plaintiff may bring a private lawsuit alleging that he or she is the
victim of retaliation for complaining about discrimination under
Title VI or Title IX. It is now common for employees or students
filing Title VI or Title IX suits to allege that their employers or
schools have retaliated against them for complaining of
13
discrimination. Neither Title VI nor Title IX explicitly prohibits
14
retaliation by recipients of federal funds. However, various federal
agencies have issued specific Title VI or Title IX regulations that
15
explicitly prohibit retaliation by recipients.
employee, but fails to correct problem); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (stating that compensatory damages are appropriate in Title IX
private right of action where school district has knowledge that teacher is engaging
in sexual harassment, but fails to take action); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (opinion of White, J.) (stating that private
damages are available where recipient has notice it is engaging in intentional
discrimination); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
Title VI provides private right of action for intentional discrimination); Horner v. Ky.
High Sch. Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 689-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Supreme
Court’s Title VI and Title IX cases agree that plaintiff must establish intentional
discrimination to receive compensatory damages).
9
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
10
Id. at 703 (holding that a private right of action exists under Title IX and
suggesting that one might also exist with respect to Title VI because Congress
modeled Title IX after Title VI).
11
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
12
Id. at 280-91.
13
See, e.g., Peters, 327 F.3d 307; Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d
1333 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004); Lowrey v. Tex.
A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F.
Supp. 2d 579, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2001); Heckman, supra note 7, at 595-610 (discussing
Title IX retaliation cases) & n.314 (listing Title IX retaliation cases); infra notes 295,
316-17, 331-35, 339, 366-72 and accompanying text.
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1344.
15
For example, the Department of Education’s regulations under Title VI
provide:
Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited. No recipient or other
person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any
individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege
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The federal circuit courts of appeals have recently divided
regarding whether a private right of action for retaliation exists
16
17
under either Title VI or Title IX. In 2003, in Peters v. Jenney, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
absence of an explicit prohibition against retaliation in Title VI does
not “lead to an inference that Congress did not mean to prohibit
retaliation in § 601” because “relevant precedent interpreting
similarly
worded
antidiscrimination
statutes”
construed
18
“discrimination” to include “retaliation.”
Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
19
Council, Inc., held that if a statute is silent or ambiguous about the
particular issue in question courts should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of that statute if it is issued as part of a valid
rule, because it is presumed that Congress delegated interpretive
power to an agency with the authority to issue rules having the “force
20
of law.”
Pursuant to Chevron, the Peters court deferred to the
secured by section 601 of the Act or this part, or because he has made a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part. The identity of
complainants shall be kept confidential except to the extent necessary
to carry out the purposes of this part, including the conduct of any
investigation, hearing, or judicial proceeding arising thereunder.
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004); see 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (2004) (Department of Education
Title IX regulation); 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(e) (2004) (Department of Justice Title VI
regulation); see also Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206
(4th Cir. 1994) (discussing Department of Education regulation 34 C.F.R. § 100.7);
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“The
Fourth Circuit has recognized that the prohibition against retaliation is a product of
a regulation, not contained in the statute itself.”) (citing Preston, 31 F.3d 203); Nelson
v. Univ. of Maine, 923 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Me. 1996) (“In the context of
retaliatory discrimination, at issue in this case, Title IX protects employees who
either participate in a Title IX investigation, or who oppose unlawful employment
practices prohibited by Title IX.”).
16
Compare Peters, 327 F.3d 307 (holding that a plaintiff can sue for retaliation
under Title VI), with Jackson, 309 F.3d 1333 (holding that a claim for retaliation does
not lie under Title IX); see Brianne J. Gorod, Case Comment, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice:
Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of Action; Peters v. Jenney,
327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d
1333 (11th Cir. 2002), Petition for Cert. Filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. May 13, 2003)
(NO. 02-1672), 113 YALE L.J. 939 (2004).
17
327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
18
Id. at 316-19.
19
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
20
See id. at 842-43 (stating courts should defer to agency’s interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language if interpretation is reasonable), 865-66 (stressing that
executive agencies have more appropriate role in defining ambiguous statutory
language because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts, and agencies
are politically accountable through elections, unlike courts); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221-30 (2001) (explaining that Chevron doctrine requires
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Department of Education’s anti-retaliation provision (34 C.F.R. §
21
100.7(e)) as an indication of how to interpret the statute. In light of
Sandoval’s holding that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit only
intentional discrimination, the Peters decision recognized a private
cause of action only for those who allege that a recipient retaliated
22
against them for complaining about intentional discrimination. It
did not recognize a private right of action for retaliation by those
complaining that a recipient had engaged in practices causing
23
disparate impacts that are forbidden by various agency regulations.
24
By contrast, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2002
rejected any private right of action against retaliation because the text
of § 901 of Title IX does not explicitly provide for such a private
25
cause of action for retaliation. Assuming arguendo that a private
right of action existed to sue recipients for retaliation, the Eleventh
Circuit observed that it would limit any such right to plaintiffs who
are the victims of gender discrimination and would not allow those
who merely allege that others have suffered gender discrimination,
26
such as the male plaintiff in that case, to pursue a retaliation claim.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the text of § 901 only identifies
victims of gender discrimination as the class it aims to benefit, but the
27
court did not believe that the text of the statute even went that far.
The Jackson decision relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2001
28
Sandoval decision. In concluding that there was no implied private

courts to defer to agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statute or fill
“gap” in a silent statute where Congress has delegated to agency authority to issue
regulations carrying “force of law”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26
(1996) (describing presumption established in Chevron that silence in statute shows
intent of Congress to leave act of interpretation in hands of agency in charge of
administering act); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34 & passim (2001) (explaining that Chevron fundamentally
expanded deference of courts to agency interpretations of statutes by presuming
gaps or ambiguities in statute reflected implicit congressional intent to delegate
interpretive authority to agency); infra notes 315, 333, 354-58 and accompanying
text. Conversely, if a statute’s language is clear and specific, a court must reject an
agency interpretation that is contrary to that language. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
21
See Peters, 327 F.3d at 315-16, 318-19.
22
See id. at 319 & n.11.
23
See id.
24
309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004).
25
Id. at 1346.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
532 U.S. 275 (2001).

52

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:047
29

right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations, the
Jackson court followed dicta in Sandoval suggesting that only express
30
statutory language may establish a private right of action. However,
to the extent that the Sandoval decision suggested in dicta that rights
of action must be express, its reasoning is contrary to the Court’s
31
precedent and prior reasoning.
The Sandoval decision itself
acknowledged that “regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional
discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that
32
section.” For example, the Court has recognized a cause of action
under Title IX for sexual harassment, even though the statute does
not explicitly prohibit such conduct, because such suits are consistent
with the statute’s core prohibition against intentional sex
33
discrimination. Additionally, the Court has held that under Title IX
a student may sue school officials for deliberate indifference
concerning her complaints of sexual harassment by other students
even though the statute contains no explicit provision authorizing
34
such a private right of action.
This Article argues that both Title VI and Title IX implicitly
authorize plaintiffs to file retaliation claims against recipients of
federal funds. Since the 1969 decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
35
Park, Inc., the Supreme Court has consistently recognized retaliation
claims as vindicating the central antidiscrimination principles of
comparable civil rights statutes, and therefore, such suits are
36
permissible even after Sandoval. Retaliation claims are rooted in
both Title VI’s and Title IX’s central purpose of prohibiting

29

See id. at 280-87.
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1341 (stating that Sandoval Court relied “exclusively on the
text and structure of Title VI” in determining that “Title VI implies no private right
to sue for actions not motivated by discriminatory intent that result in a disparate
impact.”) (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293).
31
See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 244 (2003) (arguing
that Sandoval implies private right of action must be based on explicit statutory
language, but contending that view is contrary to precedent).
32
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284; see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 315 (citing Sandoval); infra
notes 189, 212-14 and accompanying text.
33
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); Black, supra note 2, at 36263 (discussing Davis and Gebser).
34
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
35
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
36
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 13-15; infra notes 240-45
and accompanying text.
30
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37

intentional discrimination.
Additionally, following the Chevron
doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Peters appropriately deferred to agency
38
regulations interpreting Title VI and Title IX to prohibit retaliation.
Although holding that Title VI regulations could not authorize a
private right of action to enforce regulations prohibiting disparate
39
impact discrimination, the Sandoval Court recognized that these
agency regulations were effective to the extent they vindicated Title
40
Thus,
VI’s core prohibition against intentional discrimination.
courts may conclude that Title VI and Title IX implicitly allow
plaintiffs to bring retaliation claims if their employer or school
retaliates against them for complaining about intentional racial or
gender discrimination, because such suits are strongly consistent with
the statutes primary purpose of prohibiting recipients from engaging
41
in intentional discrimination.
Part I of this Article summarizes Title VI and Title IX. Part II
discusses the Supreme Court’s initially broad implication of private
rights of action for both statutes, and the Court’s subsequent
limitation of such suits. Part III examines the Supreme Court’s
inference of anti-retaliation principles in various civil statutes, and
whether the existence of an explicit anti-retaliation provision in Title
VII weighs against inferring an implicit right against retaliation under
Title VI and Title IX. Part IV then discusses the split between the
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits regarding whether Title VI and Title IX
imply a private right of action for retaliation. The Article concludes
in Part V that courts should find that Title VI and Title IX establish
an implied private right of action for retaliation because such suits
serve both statutes’ shared core prohibition against intentional
discrimination.
I. TITLE VI AND TITLE IX
A. Introduction to Title VI
Section 601 of Title VI states that “[n]o person shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

37
38
39
40
41

See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.3.
See Peters, 327 F.3d at 316-21, 323-24.
See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189, 212-13 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 334-40, 360-63, 404, 409-10.
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42

financial assistance.” The statute does not specify whether the term
“discrimination” prohibits only intentional discrimination or also
43
reaches unintentional, disparate impact discrimination.
The
statute’s legislative history contains statements supporting both
44
45
interpretations. In 1974, in Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court at
least implied and arguably held that both § 601 and § 602 of Title VI
prohibited
disparate
impact
discrimination,
stating
that
“[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect even though no
46
purposeful design is present.” However, since the 1978 decision of
47
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court has consistently
interpreted § 601 to forbid only intentional discrimination by
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, but not to
48
prohibit disparate impact discrimination.
The Supreme Court has recognized that private plaintiffs may
file a private right of action under § 601 of Title VI alleging that a
49
recipient has committed intentional discrimination. Congress has
42

42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 23-25; supra note 4 and
infra notes 43-48, 159, 161, 168-73, 176, 195, 212-13 and accompanying text.
43
See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983)
(“The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word ‘discrimination’ is
inherently so.”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he term ‘discrimination’ as used in Title VI is, of course, notoriously
ambiguous, generating more than thirty years of litigation over its precise
meaning.”); Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for
Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-23, 25-27 (1981) (arguing that 1964
legislative history of Title VI suggests Congress did not precisely define term
“discrimination,” and instead left difficult question of defining discrimination to
executive branch); Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 (2002) (observing that term “discrimination” in Title VI is
ambiguous); [hereinafter Mank, Title VI Regulations]; Michael Mello, Defunding Death,
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 959 (1995) (same); Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note
31, at 221 (same); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake
of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 92-98 (2004) (same).
44
See Abernathy, supra note 43, at 21-23, 25-27; Mello, supra note 43, at 959.
45
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
46
Id. at 568; see Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 521-22.
47
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48
See id. at 287 (Section 601 “proscribes only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment”) (opinion of
Powell, J.); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-82; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11; Karlen,
supra note 4, at 196; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 23-25. But see Abernathy, supra
note 43, at 21-23, 25-27 (arguing that 1964 legislative history of Title VI suggests
Congress left difficult question of defining discrimination to executive branch);
Mello, supra note 43, at 959 (same).
49
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (stating that it is “beyond dispute that private
individuals may sue to enforce” § 601’s prohibition against intentional
discrimination); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (holding private right of action exists under
Title IX and suggesting that private right of action also exists with respect to Title VI
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implicitly recognized such private suits by abrogating state sovereign
immunity against Title VI suits, which would not be necessary if the
50
United States was the only possible plaintiff. Furthermore, Congress
has explicitly authorized attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs in
51
Title VI cases.
Additionally, § 602 of Title VI “authorize[s] and direct[s]”
federal funding agencies to “effectuate the provisions of section 601”
by issuing and enforcing “rules, regulations or orders of general
applicability” that prohibit recipients from engaging in
discrimination and that establish a process for investigating and
52
assessing complaints of racial discrimination filed with the agency.
Section 602 also requires those regulations to be approved by the
53
President, who has delegated that authority to the Attorney General.
In 1964, a presidential task force developed standard Title VI
because Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196;
Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 31-32; Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and
Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1776 (2003).
50
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196.
51
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196.
52
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1(2000 & Supp. I 2001); see Colopy, supra note 4, at 155;
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25;
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 221; Note, supra note 49, at 1776.
53
Section 602 of Title VI states in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No
such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until
approved by the President.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12; Mank, Title VI, supra
note 4, at 25. To facilitate the enforcement of the various § 602 regulations issued by
various agencies, the DOJ has issued regulations concerning the implementation of
Title VI requirements, including a requirement that agencies adopt procedures for
monitoring a recipient’s pre- and post-award compliance. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.405
(2004) (DOJ Regulations); 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.110 & 7.115 (2004) (EPA regulations);
Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 313 (1995); Mello, supra note 43, at 961 n.143. If it finds a
recipient has engaged in discriminatory actions, an agency may refuse to award or
continue assistance, or refer the matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution.
See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (2004) (Environmental Protection Agency regulations); Fisher,
supra, at 313; Colopy, supra note 4, at 176-80. However, if a recipient is found to have
engaged in discriminatory practices, federal agencies almost always reach a
settlement with a recipient to prevent such conduct in the future, but continue to
provide funding. See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra
note 4, at 25.
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regulations prohibiting recipients from using “criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
54
discrimination.”
Soon thereafter, all cabinet agencies and
approximately forty federal agencies adopted similar regulations to
prohibit recipients from engaging in practices having discriminatory
55
impacts.
At least twenty-six agencies currently maintain such
56
regulations. For example, the Department of Justice (hereinafter
“DOJ”) has promulgated regulations stating that a recipient of
federal financial assistance shall neither “directly [n]or through
contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin,” or
which “have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects
57
individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.” Similarly,
the Department of Education’s Title VI regulations forbid recipients
to engage in either intentional discrimination or practices causing
58
disparate impacts with respect to protected minority groups.
Furthermore, the DOJ and many other federal agencies have
adopted regulations prohibiting retaliation by Title VI recipients
54

45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2004) (emphasis added); see Guardians Ass’n v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; Sidney D.
Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination—It Shouldn’t Be So
Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 947-48 (1990) (noting presidential task force in 1964
helped federal agencies promulgate comparable disparate impact regulations under
Title VI); Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964CImplementation and Impact,
36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 846 (1968); Note, supra note 49, at 1776. The task force
included representatives from the White House, DOJ, the Civil Rights Commission,
and Bureau of the Budget. Comment, supra, at 846 n.19.
55
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 n.13 (opinion of White, J.) (observing that “every
Cabinet department and about forty agencies adopted Title VI regulations
prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination”); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196 (stating
that approximately forty agencies adopted § 602 regulations); Mank, Private Cause,
supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; Watson, supra note 54, at 94748; Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581
n.25 (1992) (listing Title VI regulations for several federal agencies); Note, supra
note 49, at 1776.
56
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2004) (DOJ regulation); 34 C.F.R. §
100.3(b)(2) (2004) (Department of Education regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)
(2004) (EPA regulation); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2004) (Department of
Transportation regulation); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that at least fortyfour agencies have adopted § 602 regulations); Note, supra note 49, at 1776 (stating
that as of 2001, twenty-six agencies had disparate impact regulations).
57
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2004); see Short, supra note 4, at 119.
58
34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2004); see Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314-15 (4th Cir.
2003).

2004

ANTI-RETALIATION REGULATIONS

57

59

against those who file Title VI complaints.
For instance, the
Department of Education has issued a regulation, 34 C.F.R. §
100.7(e), that prohibits retaliation:
Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited. No recipient or other
person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against
any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or
privilege secured by section 601 of the Act or this part [§ 602
regulations], or because he has made a complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this part.60

Under § 602’s administrative regulations, individuals who file an
administrative complaint with a federal agency alleging that a
recipient of federal funds has committed discrimination have only
61
limited procedural rights. If an individual files an administrative
complaint, federal funding agencies will normally investigate the
complaint, but have virtually total discretion evaluating the complaint
62
and what actions they may take. Private complainants have no right
to participate in the agency’s administrative investigation or to
63
This lack of procedural or
receive any direct compensation.
compensatory rights explains why many potential complainants
would prefer to file a private right of action in federal court, where
they will have the right to participate and potentially receive damages
64
for intentional discrimination.
By contrast, a recipient enjoys elaborate procedural rights to
contest any finding of discrimination against it, especially if the
funding agency seeks to terminate the recipient’s funding. If a
funding agency uses its internal administrative processes to make a
finding of discrimination, a recipient has a right to contest any such
65
findings against it. A recipient may initially request a hearing before
59

28 C.F.R. § 42.108(e) (2004) (DOJ Title VI regulation).
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) (emphasis added); see Peters, 327 F.3d at 314.
61
See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12-13, 20-21 (discussing requirement in
§ 602 that funding agency investigate private complaints of discrimination against
funding recipients).
62
See id.
63
See id. at 21-23 (discussing limited procedural and substantive rights of Title VI
complainants).
64
See id. at 23-24 (discussing advantages of private right of action compared to
Title VI administrative procedures).
65
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (providing procedural protections for recipients of
federal funding); 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b)(1)-(3) (providing procedural protections for
recipients in form of EPA regulations to obtain compliance); Mank, Private Cause,
supra note 5, at 21-23; Note, supra note 49, at 1777 (discussing complex
administrative enforcement process for determining whether recipient has failed to
comply with Title VI).
60
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an administrative law judge, then may appeal to the agency head, and
ultimately the federal courts if the agency seeks to terminate the
66
recipient’s funding.
Funding agencies may not file suit directly
against allegedly discriminating recipients, but must refer any suit to
67
the Attorney General and DOJ, but such suits are relatively rare. A
federal funding agency must provide thirty days notice to relevant
congressional committees before it may terminate funding to a
68
recipient. Because of these procedural guarantees for recipients
and the practical reality that an agency’s termination of funding to a
recipient often would harm many innocent beneficiaries, federal
funding agencies almost never impose the draconian remedy of
terminating funding. Instead, agencies usually require a recipient
found guilty of discrimination to sign a binding settlement in which it
69
agrees to end any discriminatory practices.
B. Introduction to Title IX
In § 901 of Title IX, Congress declared that “[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
70
Federal financial assistance.” In North Haven Board of Education v.
71
Bell, the Supreme Court read Title IX’s antidiscrimination mandate
broadly to address discrimination not expressly prohibited by the
statute, stating that “[t]here is no doubt that ‘if we are to give [Title
66

See supra note 65.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 & 2000d-2; Note, supra note 49, at 1777.
68
See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 283, 292-93 (1996) (observing that termination of funds to recipient is generally
an ineffective administrative enforcement mechanism because federal funding
agencies are reluctant to terminate aid to recipients and face procedural barriers
even if they wish to do so); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 21-23 (observing that
funding agencies frequently settle Title VI discrimination complaints against
recipients of federal aid because termination is procedurally difficult and innocent
beneficiaries would be hurt); Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After
Gonzaga v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1431-32 (2003) (same) [hereinafter Mank,
Gonzaga]; Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV.
600, 619-23 (1972) (concluding that federal government has difficult time forcing
states to comply with federal grant-in-aid requirements because of procedural
barriers and negative consequences of funding termination); Note, supra note 49, at
1777 (stating agencies rarely use draconian authority to terminate funding to
recipient because of need to notify Congress).
69
See supra note 68.
70
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
71
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
67
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IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as
72
broad as its language.’“ For instance, the Court interpreted Title IX
to allow for money damages in a private cause of action, although the
73
statute does not expressly provide for such damages. Additionally,
the Court implied a right in cases of sexual harassment, including
student-on-student sexual harassment that is deliberately ignored by
74
school officials.
Congress modeled Title IX of the Education Amendments of
75
76
1972 after Title VI. Congress enacted both Title VI and Title IX
pursuant to its Spending Clause authority and used a similar statutory
77
structure. Additionally, the Department of Education looked to its
78
Title VI regulations as a primary source for its Title IX regulations.
79
Because Title IX “was patterned after Title VI,” the Supreme
Court in Cannon and subsequent decisions has by and large
80
interpreted the two statutes similarly.
In Cannon, the Court
examined Title IX’s legislative history and concluded that the statute
had two primary goals: “[f]irst, Congress wanted to avoid the use of
federal resources to support discriminatory practices; [and] second, it
wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against
81
those practices.” Although Congress modeled Title IX’s statutory
language after that of Title VI, Congress also intended Title IX to
close at least some gaps in Title VII’s prohibition against sex
82
discrimination in employment cases.
72

Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1976)) (second
alteration in original).
73
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
74
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
75
20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
76
See infra notes 79-82, 112, 121-26, 130 and accompanying text.
77
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286-88 (1998); Litman
v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582 (E.D. Va. 2001).
78
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004); Litman, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 582; Short, supra note
4, at 121.
79
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95 (“Title IX was patterned after Title VI . . . . Except
for the substitution of the word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color, or
national origin’ in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the
benefitted class.”).
80
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.
2002) (stating that courts should construe Title VI and Title IX in pari materia);
Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003).
81
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 29, 48-49,
59-60 (discussing Title VI and Title IX’s dual purposes).
82
See Julie Carroll Fay, Note, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Is
It Really the Final Word on School Liability for Teacher-to-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1999); The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, 112
HARV. L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1998) [hereinafter The Supreme Court 1997 Term].
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In the statute’s legislative history, the primary congressional
drafter of Title IX, Senator Bayh, stated that the “heart” of Title IX
was to “cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures,
scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions,” to
address issues not covered by Title VI or Title VII of the 1964 Civil
83
Rights Act. Additionally, Senator Bayh stated that Title IX seeks to
eliminate “loopholes in existing legislation relating to general
education programs and employment resulting from those
84
programs.” The statute applies to virtually all public and private
educational institutions, and includes all institutional operations such
85
as academic programs or athletics.
Pursuant to § 902 of the statute, any federal department or
agency that “is empowered to extend [f]ederal financial assistance to
any education program or activity” is “authorized and directed to
86
effectuate the provisions of” § 901. Like § 602 of Title VI, § 902 of
Title IX requires agencies to “issue rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability” that may not “become effective unless and until
87
approved by the President.” Similarly, § 902 provides that federal
funding agencies may enforce “compliance with any requirement
adopted pursuant to this section . . . by the termination of or refusal
88
to grant or to continue assistance . . . .”
The Department of Education used its Title VI regulations as a
primary source for its regulations under § 902 of Title IX by declaring
89
that, “[t]he procedural provisions applicable to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by
90
reference.” Additionally, the Department of Education regulations
83

118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh), cited in Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Fay, supra note 82,
at 1490.
84
118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Fay, supra note
82, at 1490; Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer
Sexual Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1014, 1021 (1998).
85
See Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’
Unique Environment for Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with
Preventing Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 183 (2003); see also Fay, supra
note 82, at 1489.
86
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
638-39 (1999); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th
Cir. 2002).
87
20 U.S.C. § 1682; Davis, 526 U.S. at 638-39; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337.
88
See supra note 87.
89
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d
579, 582 (E.D. Va. 2001); Short, supra note 4, at 121.
90
See supra note 89.
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address the particular characteristics of educational institutions by
specifying that a recipient of federal financial assistance shall not
“administer or operate any test or other criterion for admission which
has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of
91
sex.” Like the parallel regulations under § 602 of Title VI, § 902 and
its regulations set forth extensive administrative procedures for
investigations and hearings of complaints of discrimination against
92
recipients. The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights
(hereinafter “OCR”) is a party to all proceedings and takes the lead
93
in the process.
Complainants enjoy few rights under the Department of
Education’s § 902 regulations. Although the regulations give “[a]ny
person who believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be
subjected to discrimination” by a recipient the right to file a
94
complaint, the regulations also state that Title IX complainants are
95
not parties to the proceedings, but may only become amici curiae.
Under the Department of Education regulations, individuals have no
96
right to a judgment for damages.
97
By contrast, Title IX recipients (like Title VI recipients) are
parties to the investigation and possess extensive due process rights if
OCR conducts hearings to consider the termination of a recipient’s
98
funding. Section 902 explicitly requires agencies to seek voluntary
compliance from recipients before the agency may terminate
99
funding, and requires that the agency provide the recipient with an

91

34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b) (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 120.
See 34 C.F.R. § 101 (2004); see also Fay, supra note 82, at 1492; Short, supra note
4, at 123.
93
See 34 C.F.R. § 101.21 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122.
94
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2004).
95
34 C.F.R. § 101.23 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122.
96
Fay, supra note 82, at 1492-93.
97
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (providing procedural
protections for recipients of federal funding); 40 § C.F.R. 7.130(b)(1)-(3) (2004)
(EPA regulations providing procedural protections for recipients); Mank, Private
Cause, supra note 5, at 21-23; Note, supra note 49, at 1777 (discussing complex
administrative enforcement process for determining whether recipient has failed to
comply with Title VI).
98
The regulations only mention two sides, the recipient (or grant applicant) and
the Department of Education: “(a) The term party shall include an applicant or
recipient or other person to whom a notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing
has been mailed naming him a respondent. (b) The Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights of the Department of Education, shall be deemed a party to all proceedings.”
34 C.F.R. § 101.21 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122.
99
20 U.S.C. § 1682(2) (2000); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309
F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
92
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opportunity for a hearing before any funding termination.
Additionally, after it makes an “express finding” of noncompliance,
an agency may not terminate funding to a recipient until the agency
files “a full written report” to “the committees of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity
involved” and waits “until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of
101
such report.”
Finally, § 903 guarantees recipients the right of
judicial review to challenge any termination or other decision an
102
agency makes pursuant to § 902.
The OCR does not normally
recommend termination of funding, but instead usually enters into
binding settlements with recipients, which specify measures to avoid
103
discriminatory practices in the future.
This routine outcome is in
part a result of Title IX’s extensive procedural protections with
respect to recipients (which are similar to the protections under Title
104
VI).
II. TITLE VI, TITLE IX, AND PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Because the Title VI and Title IX administrative processes
provide limited procedural rights and no right of compensation to
complainants, a number of plaintiffs have attempted to enforce
either Title VI or Title IX as a private right of action in federal court,
where plaintiffs potentially have the full panoply of procedural rights,
including discovery, the right to a trial, and equitable or
105
compensatory remedies.
Like most statutes enacted during the
106
1960s, Title VI is silent regarding whether private individuals who
allege that a recipient has discriminated against them may bring a
107
private right of action.
In 1964, when Congress enacted Title VI,
the Supreme Court had recently adopted a liberal approach to
implied private rights of action in its seminal decision, J.I. Case Co. v.
108
Borak, which allowed private investors to bring private suits for
securities fraud because it would advance the general purposes of the

100

20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337.
102
20 U.S.C. § 1683 (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337.
103
See Short, supra note 4, at 123.
104
See supra note 97.
105
See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 23-24 (discussing advantages of private
right of action compared to Title VI administrative procedures).
106
Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 816, 846-47 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, Context];
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225.
107
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225.
108
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
101
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statute despite the absence of any explicit textual support in the
109
Until the middle 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower
statute.
courts liberally construed the Borak holding to allow private plaintiffs
to file statutory suits even if a statute did not contain an explicit
remedy for individual suits. Often, such statutes only explicitly
110
allowed, for instance, suits by federal administrative agencies.
During the 1960s and 1970s, several lower court decisions concluded
111
that Title VI established a private cause of action. When it enacted
Title IX in 1972, Congress was aware of these decisions implying a
112
private right of action under Title VI.
113
However, in 1975, the Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash, adopted a
four-part test for determining whether a private right of action was
114
implied in a statute, with congressional intent being one factor.
109

Id. at 431-33 (stating that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose” expressed by
a statute); Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 845.
110
See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (Social Security Act of 1935, as
amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964); see also
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The
Supreme Court implied private rights of action with a relatively free hand until its
decision in Cort v. Ash.”) (citations omitted), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1832 (June 14,
2004); Key, supra note 68, at 294 (describing the effect of Borak on private rights of
action); Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1423; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at
25-27 (discussing Supreme Court and lower court cases from 1964 until late 1970s
that found implied private right of action in federal statutes); Michael A. Mazzuchi,
Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1062, 1073-74 (1992) (observing that between 1964 and 1975 the Supreme
Court took an expansive approach to private rights of action). But see Susan J.
Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights of
Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 866, 867 & nn.32 & 34 (1996) (arguing that
courts were reluctant before 1975 to imply private rights of action, except perhaps in
securities area).
111
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 n.20 (1979) (citing Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967); S. Christian Leadership
Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940, 942-43 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Gautreaux
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967)); see also Mank, Context,
supra note 106, at 848 n.213; Stabile, supra note 110, at 891 n.165.
112
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-98 (presuming both that Congress was aware of cases
interpreting Title VI and intended to follow that interpretation for Title IX);
Courtney G. Joslin, Recognizing a Cause of Action Under Title IX for Student-Student Sexual
Harassment, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201, 207 (1999); infra notes 121-26, 130 and
accompanying text.
113
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
114
Id. at 78 (stating four-part test: (1) is plaintiff part of a class that statute intends
to provide with special status or benefits?; (2) is there implicit or explicit evidence
that Congress intended to create or deny the proposed private right of action?; (3) is
such a private right of action consistent with underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for plaintiff?; and (4) is the cause of action one
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Although the Court likely intended the Cort four-part test to limit the
creation of new implied private rights of action, the courts of appeals
continued to create them in at least twenty instances from 1975 until
115
1979.
A key question was whether the Court would affirm lower
court decisions creating a private right of action under Title VI or
Title IX in light of the Cort test.
A. Cannon v. University of Chicago: Recognizing a Private Right
of Action Under Title IX and Title VI
1.

Cannon Recognizes a Private Right of Action Under
Title IX

The Supreme Court’s Cannon decision recognized a private right
to bring an action in federal court against various educational
116
institutions receiving federal funds under § 901(a) of Title IX.
Cannon was the Court’s last major case to adopt a broad
interpretation of implied private rights of action under the Cort four117
118
part test.
Under Cort’s first prong, the Court found that the
plaintiff was a member of the class that the statute was intended to
119
benefit—namely, students.
Under Cort’s second prong, whether Congress intended to
120
establish a private right of action, the Court found that Congress
had intended that there be a right of action under Title IX, because
traditionally relegated to state law, and thus in an area where a federal cause of
action would intrude on important state concerns?); see also Mank, Private Cause,
supra note 5, at 26-27 & n.159; Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI’s
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 354-551 (2000) [hereinafter Mank,
Section 1983]; Stabile, supra note 110, at 867 & n.38.
115
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Mank,
Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1424; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 27 & n.159.
116
441 U.S. 677 (1979); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28-30; Fay,
supra note 82, at 1494-95.
117
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709 (finding that all factors in Cort’s four-part test favor
conclusion that Title IX creates private right of action); see also Fay, supra note 82, at
1494-95 (discussing Cannon’s use of the Cort four-part test); Joslin, supra note 112, at
219-20 (same); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28 (same). The first three
prongs are discussed in the text of this Article. Cort’s fourth prong, whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, and thus in an area where a
federal cause of action would intrude on important state concerns, was easily
addressed because the federal government since the Civil War has taken the leading
role in combating discrimination. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708-09; Fay, supra note 82, at
1495; Joslin, supra note 112, at 207.
118
Cort’s first prong is whether the plaintiff is part of a class that the statute
intends to benefit. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
119
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
120
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
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it had patterned the statute after Title VI, while being aware that
121
courts had already recognized such a right under Title VI. Because
Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, including the use of
virtually identical statutory language and the same procedures for
termination of funding, the Cannon decision relied on prior
interpretation of Title VI’s language, legislative history, and
regulations as strong indicators of Congress’ intent to create a private
122
right of action under Title IX.
Accordingly, courts and
commentators have interpreted Cannon to recognize a private right
123
of action under both statutes. Justice Stevens’ majority opinion first
observed, “[t]he drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would
be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding
124
eight years.” The Justice then noted that “[i]n 1972 when Title IX
was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been
125
construed as creating a private remedy.”
The Court stated that it
was appropriate to assume that Congress was aware of the numerous
lower federal court decisions interpreting Title VI as creating a
private right of action when it enacted Title IX, and hence, that the
legislature assumed that Title IX likewise created a private right of
126
action.
Additionally, acknowledging that Cort and other recent decisions
by the Court had begun to apply a “strict approach” in deciding
whether to create a private right of action, the Cannon Court
determined that its “evaluation of congressional action in 1972 must
take into account its contemporary legal context”; that is, the more
liberal standard used in deciding whether Congress, when it enacted
127
Title IX, intended to create such a private right of action. Because
the Court had in six cases from 1964 to 1972 recognized a private
cause of action in statutes that included no specific reference to these

121

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96.
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-703; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28.
123
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-703; Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of
Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1989); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. &
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987); Chowdbury v. Reading
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts have consistently
held the [Title IX] language of Cannon to be applicable in discussions of Title VI.”);
118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57
nn.140-41.
124
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16; see also United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532,
1548 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Fisher, supra note 53, at 318, 329.
125
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696; see also id. at nn.20-21 (citing cases); Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967).
126
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-703, 710-11.
127
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99; Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 847-49.
122
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remedies, the Cannon Court held that there was an implied private
right of action under Title IX and, by implication, under Title VI,
128
because the former statute was modeled upon the latter one. In his
concurring opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist, who has generally
129
opposed implied private causes of action, conceded that Congress
had probably assumed when it enacted Titles VI and IX that courts
would decide whether a civil rights statute contained an implied
private right of action. Justice Rehnquist observed:
We do not write on an entirely clean slate, however, and the
Court’s opinion demonstrates that Congress, at least during the
period of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights
Act tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide
whether there should be a private right of action, rather than
determining this question for itself. Cases such as J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, and numerous cases from other federal courts, gave
Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary would
undertake this task.130

In addressing Cort’s third prong, whether a private right of
131
action would serve the statute’s purposes,
the Cannon court
concluded that Titles IX and VI “sought to accomplish two related,
132
First, Congress
but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives.”
intended to prohibit the use of federal funds to support recipients’
133
discriminatory practices. The Court observed that private litigation
is not essential in serving this purpose because the federal funding
agency can deter discriminatory practices by using the statutory
procedure for termination of federal financial support to a recipient
134
engaged in such behavior.
Additionally, however, the Cannon
decision concluded that Congress had intended the statute not only
to prevent the use of federal funds to support discriminatory
programs, but also to “provide individual citizens effective protection
128

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 n.23; Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 848 (discussing
Title VI implied right of action cases relied upon by Cannon court); Mank, Private
Cause, supra note 5, at 28-29.
129
Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 849-50 (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist
has usually opposed courts finding implied private right of action absent evidence of
clear congressional intent to create such a remedy); Stabile, supra, note 110, at 88485 n.131 (observing that Justice Rehnquist in his Cannon concurrence stated his
general opposition to judicially implied private right of action absent evidence of
clear congressional intent to create such a remedy).
130
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Mank, Context,
supra note 106, at 849-50.
131
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
132
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704; see also Fay, supra note 82, at 1494-95.
133
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
134
Id.
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135

against these practices.”
The Court determined that only private
remedies could secure the statute’s interest in protecting individuals.
The Court also noted that a complainant could not participate in the
136
administrative process.
Moreover, the Court observed that the
administrative process provided no assurance that a finding of a
137
violation would result in relief for the complainant.
Accordingly,
the Court concluded that a private remedy was consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme and would not
138
interfere with the agency’s administrative enforcement process.
Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning implied that there should be a
private right of action under both Title VI and Title IX because both
failed to provide direct remedies for complainants and allowed the
funding agency only the indirect remedy of terminating a recipient’s
139
Cannon did not explicitly address whether there is a
funding.
private right of action under either Title VI or Title IX’s regulations
140
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.
Although the Cannon decision did not explicitly hold that there
was an implied right of action under Title VI, commentators and
courts have overwhelmingly interpreted Cannon as clearly implying
141
such a right.
In Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission, Justice
White observed, “it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court’s
opinion that the congressional view was correct as to the availability
142
of private actions to enforce Title VI.”
In 1992, the Court
reaffirmed Cannon’s private right of action, unanimously holding in
143
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, that plaintiffs in a Title IX
case may receive compensatory damages from a school district for
intentional discrimination, including sexual harassment by a teacher
against a student, when a student notified the district about the

135

Id.
Id. at 706-07 n.41.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 704-08.
139
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41.
140
See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 30.
141
See supra note 123. Because § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
was also modeled on Title VI and contains nearly identical language to both Titles VI
and IX, most courts interpret Title VI in light of Title IX and § 504 case law. See
United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600
(1986); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (noting that § 504 was
originally proposed as an amendment to Title VI); Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57
n.140. But see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 n.13 (1984)
(recognizing differences between Title VI and § 504).
142
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 594.
143
503 U.S. 60 (1992).
136
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harassment, but the district failed to stop the harassment.
The
Court stated, “the point of not permitting monetary damages for an
unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds
lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award. This notice
problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional
145
discrimination is alleged.”
Thus, under both Titles VI and IX,
plaintiffs may receive monetary damages if they can prove a recipient
engaged in intentionally discriminatory practices that harmed
146
them.
2.

After Cannon, the Supreme Court Restricts Private
Rights of Action

In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell argued that
courts should recognize an implied private right of action only where
there is clear evidence in the statute that Congress intended such a
147
right.
The Supreme Court has never overruled Cannon’s holding
148
that there is an implied right of action under Title IX.
However,
since 1979, the Court has increasingly curtailed its recognition of
implied private rights of action, as evinced by the Court’s requiring
plaintiffs to prove that Congress intended to authorize remedies for
149
private litigants.
The Court has considered the remaining three
Cort factors only to the extent that they help courts understand such

144

Id. at 63-65, 74-75; see also Joslin, supra note 112, at 207-09 (discussing Franklin).
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (citation omitted); see also Joslin, supra note 112, at
208-09 (discussing Franklin).
146
See Fay, supra note 82, at 1501.
147
441 U.S. 748 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148
In Jackson, the court stated:
The Supreme Court has plainly receded from the four-part Cort analysis
that animated Cannon, focusing instead only on congressional intent to
create a private right of action . . . . But the Court has not overturned
the specific holding of Cannon, and so a direct victim of gender
discrimination still may pursue a private right of action under Title IX
to remedy the discrimination she has suffered.
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002).
149
The Jackson court stated:
Since the late 1970’s, the Court has gradually receded from reliance on
three of these four factors, focusing more and more exclusively on
legislative intent alone [citing cases]. Sandoval is the culmination of
this trend, announcing that “statutory intent . . . is determinative.” The
other three Cort factors remain relevant only insofar as they provide
evidence of Congress’s intent.
Id. at 1339 n.5 (citations omitted); see also Karlen, supra note 4, at 197; Key, supra
note 68, at 294-96; Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right,
supra note 5, at 31-32, 44-46; Stabile, supra note 110, at 868-71.
145
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legislative intent.
Justice Scalia, who in Sandoval and other
decisions has sought to restrict judicially implied private rights of
action, subsequently described Cannon as “exemplifi[ng]” an
“expansive rights-creating approach” to inferring private rights of
action from statutes that lack any explicit textual support for such
remedies and indicated that the Court would not use that approach
151
in addressing any new private rights claims.
152
For instance, in 2001, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
the Court rejected an implied right of action for even constitutional
153
violations.
The Malesko Court limited its decision in Bivens v. Six
154
Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which had recognized
an implied right of action for illegal governmental searches in
155
In a concurring opinion in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Malesko, Justice Scalia declared, “the heady days in which this Court
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing
them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or
156
constitutional prohibition” are gone.
Some plaintiffs have filed §
1983 suits for alleged statutory violations in order to avoid these
limitations, but the Court has begun to close off that alternative
157
avenue of litigation as well.
B. Guardians: A Muddy Title VI Decision
158

In 1983, in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission, a deeply
divided Supreme Court issued a complex opinion which held that
proof of intentional discrimination is required under § 601 of Title
VI, but also indicated that an agency implementing regulations under
159
§ 602 may prohibit disparate impact discrimination. The Guardians
150

See supra note 149.
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
152
534 U.S. 61 (2001).
153
Id. at 66-69; see also Karlen, supra note 4, at 197 (discussing Malesko).
154
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
155
See Karlen, supra note 4, at 197-98 (discussing Bivens).
156
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Karlen, supra note 4, at
197.
157
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (limiting enforcement of
rights under § 1983 to statutes in which there is “clear” and “unambiguous” evidence
that Congress intended to create an individual right); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra
note 68, at 1420-21, 1446-51, 1480-82 (discussing to what extent Gonzaga limited §
1983 suits); Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of
a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1838-41, 1854-58, 188187 (2003) (same); infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
158
463 U.S. 582 (1983).
159
See id. at 584 n.2; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13-15; Mank, Title
151
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Court looked both back to its liberal approach to private rights of
action in its recent Cannon opinion as well as forward to its
160
increasingly narrow jurisprudence limiting such rights of action.
The decision involved two difficult but interrelated questions: first,
the substantive standard for defining “discrimination” under Title VI
and second, the remedies available to private plaintiffs who proved
161
discrimination in violation of the statute.
In Guardians, the plaintiffs were black and Hispanic members of
the New York City Police Department who alleged that the
department had violated the Department of Labor’s Title VI
regulations, which barred recipients from engaging in practices
162
having racially disparate impacts,
by using biased written
examinations to make initial hiring decisions and to decide layoffs
163
among officers with equal seniority.
The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found sufficient evidence
of disparate impacts as a result of the examinations to establish a
164
violation of Title VI, and awarded the plaintiffs compensatory relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however,
reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that Title VI
required proof of discriminatory intent rather than simply a disparate
165
impact.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit,
determining that a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to
166
obtain compensatory relief under Title VI.
However, five justices
arguably concluded, or at least implied, that Title VI plaintiffs who
VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 523-27.
160
See supra notes 117, 142, 149-50 and accompanying text & infra notes 169-76,
218-20, 227 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting interpretations of whether
Guardians’s majority adopted narrow or broad approach to private rights of action
under Title VI).
161
See Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524; Mello, supra note 43, at 965.
162
See 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(1) (2004); Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at
524.
163
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; See also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14;
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524.
164
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y. City Police Dep’t, Inc.
v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at
524.
165
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; see also Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y. City Police
Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 633 F.2d 232, 270 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kelleher,
J., concurring); id. at 274 (Coffin, J., concurring); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5,
at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524.
166
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
612, 615 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 642-45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at
14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524.
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proved that a recipient’s practices caused disparate impacts were
167
entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief.
In Guardians, a majority concluded that § 601 prohibited only
168
intentional discrimination. The opinion by Justice White suggested
that the recipient must have knowledge of the intentional conduct,
stating that it was not “uncommon in the law for the extent of a
169
defendant’s liability to turn on the extent of his knowledge.”
By
contrast, Justices White and Marshall argued in separate concurring
and dissenting opinions that § 601’s definition of “discrimination”
included a prohibition against practices that result in disparate
170
impacts on protected minority groups.
Nonetheless, even though the Court concluded that § 601 only
bars intentional discrimination, five members of the Guardians Court
stated or strongly implied that § 602 authorizes federal agencies to
issue regulations prohibiting recipient practices that result in
171
disparate impact discrimination.
For instance, Justice Stevens, in
his dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun),
argued that § 601 prohibits intentional discrimination, and that § 602
authorizes disparate impact regulations: “[A]lthough petitioners had
to prove that the respondents’ actions were motivated by an invidious
intent in order to prove a violation of [Title VI], they only had to
show that the respondents’ actions were producing discriminatory
167

See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 (opinion of White, J.) (stating that only
declaratory and injunctive relief was appropriate); id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ. ); id. at 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (would
allow full compensation); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524;
Mello, supra note 43, at 965.
168
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment, joined by
Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.); id. at 612, 615 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); see also
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280; Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra
note 5, at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524.
169
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597 n.20 (opinion of White, J.); see also Anne D. Byrne,
Casenote and Comment, School District Liability Under Title IX for Sexual Abuse of a
Student by a Teacher, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 600 (1999).
170
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615,
623 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14, 33;
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524-25; Mello, supra note 43, at 965.
171
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 591-95 (opinion of White, J.) (“The
threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to
prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI . . . and administrative
implementing regulations promulgated thereunder. I conclude, as do four other
Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of
discriminatory intent.”); id. at 635-39, 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 623, 625-26, 634 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14, 33-34; Mank,
Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 525-27; Mello, supra note 43, at 965-68.
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effects in order to prove a violation of [the regulations].”
Justice
Stevens argued that prior precedent, including Lau, supported the
authority of federal agencies to issue disparate impact regulations
173
pursuant to § 602.
Additionally, the Justice contended that the
plaintiffs could enforce and receive compensation for violations of §
602 disparate impact regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the
regulations were reasonably related to the purposes of the statute and
174
therefore had the “force of law” under § 1983. Justices White and
Marshall each would have allowed disparate impact suits under either
175
§ 601 or § 602.
Accordingly, five members of the Guardians
Court—Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens—
suggested or averred that plaintiffs could enforce § 602 disparate
impact regulations, either directly as an implied right of action or
176
indirectly through § 1983.
177
In 1985, in Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court addressed
whether plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case under § 504 of the
178
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
by proving disparate impact
179
discrimination.
Because Congress modeled § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act on Title VI and used nearly identical language,
Choate relied on the Court’s Title VI jurisprudence, especially the
180
Guardians decision.
The Court conceded that “Title VI itself
172

Guardians, 463 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause,
supra note 5, at 14-15, 34; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 525.
173
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Title VI
Regulations, supra note 43, at 525.
174
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Section
1983, supra note 114, at 341 (discussing Justice Stevens’ argument that Title VI’s
disparate impact regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Mank, Title VI
Regulations, supra note 43, at 525-26 Mello, supra note 43, at 965, 967-68.
175
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615,
623 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 15, 33-34;
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 526-27.
176
See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 635-45
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 615, 623-26, 634
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997) (summarizing Guardians and concluding that
five justices determined that plaintiffs could enforce § 602 disparate impact
regulations), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra
note 43, at 525-27.
177
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
178
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
179
Choate, 469 U.S. at 290-91; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at
527.
180
Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 n.13 (explaining that § 504 was originally proposed as
an amendment to Title VI); see also United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 (1986) (stating that § 504 and its regulations were
modeled after Title VI); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527;
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directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”
However, the Choate decision unanimously read Guardians to
authorize federal agencies to issue § 602 regulations forbidding
recipient practices resulting in disparate impact discrimination,
stating that “[t]he [Guardians] Court held that actions having an
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of
182
Title VI.”
Additionally, the Choate Court indicated in dicta that
Guardians had suggested that there was an implied private right of
action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations: “Guardians
suggests that the regulations implementing § 504, upon which
respondents in part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact
183
challenged in this case.”
C. Sandoval: Rejecting Private Rights of Action for Disparate Impact
Regulations
1.

Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion: No Private Right of
Action Under Title VI for Disparate Impact
Discrimination

Although neither Guardians nor Choate clearly decided whether a
private right of action exists to enforce § 602 disparate impact
regulations, these decisions arguably implied such a result. Every
federal court of appeals that addressed this question before Sandoval
concluded that private plaintiffs may bring a private right of action to
184
enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. However, in Sandoval,
Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 n.140. But see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S.
624, 632-33 n.13 (1984) (recognizing differences between Title VI and § 504).
181
Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527.
182
Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527.
183
Choate, 469 U.S. at 294 (footnote omitted); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations,
supra note 43, at 527-28.
184
See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 501-07 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d sub
nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397400 (3d Cir. 1999); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on
other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir.
1996); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); City
of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d
1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); see
also Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (dictum); Latinos
Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir.
1986) (dictum); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465-66 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986)
(dictum); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 35-36 n.209; Rosenbaum &
Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225 n.53. One decision, New York City Envtl. Justice
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000), questioned but did not decide
whether there is a private right of action to enforce § 602 disparate impact
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the Supreme Court held that § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate
185
impact practices do not create a federal private right of action. The
Sandoval plaintiffs claimed that the § 602 disparate impact regulations
186
established a private right of action.
They contended that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety’s policy of administering its
driver’s license examination only in English established a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of the relevant §
187
602 regulations.
To determine the meaning of § 602, the Sandoval Court
emphasized that its purpose was “to effectuate the provisions of [§
601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
188
applicability.”
Acknowledging that Guardians and Choate had
established that § 601 creates an implied private right of action
against intentional discrimination, the Sandoval Court observed that
“private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain
189
both injunctive relief and damages.”
Concluding that Guardians
and Choate were not controlling precedent, Justice Scalia, writing the
majority opinion, determined that the present case raised the
different question of whether there is a private right of action to
enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact
190
discrimination.
Rejecting Justice Stevens’ argument that the
Cannon decision had implicitly recognized a private right of action to
191
enforce disparate impact regulations, the Court concluded that
although Cannon had held “that Title IX created a private right of
action to enforce its ban on intentional discrimination,” that decision
did not “consider whether the right reached regulations barring
192
disparate-impact discrimination.” Similarly, rejecting any argument
that the Guardians decision had held or implied that there was a
private right of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting
disparate impact discrimination, the Sandoval Court determined that
Guardians merely “held that private individuals could not recover
compensatory damages under Title VI except for intentional

regulations. See id. at 69-72.
185
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
186
Id. at 278-79.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 278 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1) (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Short, supra note 4, at 126.
189
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; Guardians, 463 U.S.
at 610-11); see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26.
190
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81; see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26.
191
See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
192
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282; see also Short, supra note 4, at 126.
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193

discrimination.”
Moreover, the Court concluded that Justice
Stevens’ Guardians opinion had not addressed the “question of a
direct private right of action to enforce the regulations,” because it
194
was not an issue presented in the case.
The Sandoval Court determined that plaintiffs may not file a
private right of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting
disparate impact discrimination because those regulations go beyond
the core prohibition against intentional discrimination in § 601.
Although the Court’s 1974 Lau decision had implied that both § 601
and § 602 prohibited disparate impact discrimination, subsequent
decisions had made it “clear now that the disparate-impact
regulations do not simply apply § 601—since they indeed forbid
conduct that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right
of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce
195
these regulations.”
Furthermore, “assum[ing] for purposes of this
decision that § 602 confers the authority to promulgate disparateimpact regulations,” the Sandoval Court stated, “the question remains
whether it confers a private right of action to enforce them. If not,
we must conclude that a failure to comply with regulations
promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with §
196
601 is not actionable.”
In determining whether § 602 disparate impact regulations
establish a private right of action, the Sandoval Court used its postCort principle that “private rights of action to enforce federal law
197
must be created by Congress.” With respect to statutory intent, the
Sandoval Court refused to consider whether a private right of action
would serve Title VI’s purposes or even whether Congress in 1964
assumed that courts would imply a private right of action. The Court
observed that, since Cort v. Ash, it had consistently rejected Borak’s
view that “‘it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose’ expressed by a statute,” even when the Court reviewed
198
statutes enacted before Cort v. Ash was decided.
Rejecting the
respondents’ argument that it should apply Borak’s approach to a
statute enacted just after that decision, the Sandoval Court declared,
193

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282-83; see also Short, supra note 4, at 126.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 283 n.3. But see id. at 300 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(taking issue with the Court’s reading of his statement in Guardians).
195
Id. at 284.
196
Id. at 286; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859; Short, supra note 4, at
127.
197
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
198
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 433).
194
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“[h]aving sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent,
199
we will not accept respondents’ invitation to have one last drink.”
2.

A Textualist Approach to Private Rights of Action

The Sandoval Court focused on the text of § 602 in deciding
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action to
enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. Applying a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation, the Court observed that “[t]he
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also
a private remedy.
Statutory intent on this latter point is
200
determinative.”
The Court concluded that “[w]e therefore begin
(and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent with the
201
text and structure of Title VI.”
The Court’s focus on the statute’s
text in determining whether a statute established a private right of
action led it to reject the respondents’ argument that rights might
202
arise from agency regulations.
The Court announced that
“[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that
203
Congress has not.”
The Court emphasized that regulations alone
may not create individual rights, stating that “it is most certainly
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private
cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies
204
may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.”
199

Id.; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859-60; Short, supra note 4, at 128.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
201
Id. at 288; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860; Short, supra note 4, at
128-29.
202
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860; Short,
supra note 4, at 129.
203
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); see also Mank, Context, supra note
106, at 860; Short, supra note 4, at 129.
204
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. Lower courts have disagreed as to what extent
agency regulations may guide courts in defining statutory rights. Compare Save Our
Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding valid agency
regulations such as Title VI disparate impact regulations could not establish
individual rights enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish
enforceable rights through statutes and Title VI only prohibited intentional
discrimination), and Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies
and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613 (arguing that Title VI
regulations do not establish right enforceable under § 1983), with Langlois v.
Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 50-53 (D. Mass. 2002) (concluding that
valid agency regulations may establish individual rights enforceable through § 1983,
and holding that certain HUD regulations under Title VIII, Fair Housing Act of
1968, are enforceable through § 1983, and also suggesting in dicta that Title VI
disparate impact regulations are enforceable through § 1983), and Recent Case, Save
200
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Because of its textualist approach, the Sandoval Court refused to
apply the approach it had used in Cannon; namely, considering the
contemporary legal context of liberal implication of private rights of
action in Borak and other decisions at the time Congress enacted
205
Title VI in 1964.
The Sandoval majority went on to disagree “with
the Government that our cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to
Cort v. Ash have given dispositive weight to the expectations that the
enacting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal
206
context.” The Court responded that “legal context matters only to
207
A strong argument can be made,
the extent it clarifies text.”
however, that courts should consider the contemporary legal context
in which Congress enacted a statute to understand the text of the
208
statute.
Because the text of § 602 does not include any explicit provision
authorizing private remedies, the Sandoval decision concluded that
there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact
209
regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI.
The Court also
determined that subsequent amendments to Title VI did not provide
sufficient evidence that Congress intended to create a private right of
action to enforce § 602’s regulations, because those amendments did
not explicitly recognize such remedies, even if many members of
Congress tacitly assumed that they existed because of numerous lower
210
court decisions implying such rights.
Accordingly, the Sandoval
decision held that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later
amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under §
211
602. We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”
However, Sandoval acknowledged that plaintiffs could still bring
a private action against recipients by alleging that they had

Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 735
(2003) (criticizing Ninth Circuit’s holding in Save Our Valley that Title VI regulations
do not establish right enforceable under § 1983).
205
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 817, 859-60,
866-70 (arguing that Sandoval decision was wrong in failing to consider
contemporary legal context of liberal implication of private rights of action when
Congress enacted Title VI in 1964); Short, supra note 4, at 128 (discussing Sandoval
decision’s rejection of contemporary legal context doctrine).
206
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
207
Id. at 286.
208
See supra note 205.
209
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-92; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860.
210
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291-92; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860-61;
Short, supra note 4, at 129.
211
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
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committed intentional discrimination in violation of either § 601 or
212
“regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination.”
Citing Chevron, the Court stated that regulations, including those
promulgated under § 602, were enforceable to the extent that they
effectuated § 601’s core prohibition against intentional
discrimination:
We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban on
intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to
enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable,
authoritatively construe the statute itself . . . . A Congress that
intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of
action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be
so enforced as well.213

As discussed in Parts IV.B.3 and V.C, infra, according to this
reasoning, anti-retaliation regulations under Title VI or Title IX
would be enforceable if they addressed § 601 or § 901’s ban on
intentional discrimination, rather than practices causing disparate
214
impacts.
Furthermore, the Sandoval Court in dicta questioned the validity
of the § 602 disparate impact regulations, although it did not decide
the issue because the petitioners had not challenged the regulations,
but only whether they were enforceable through a private right of
215
action.
Questioning whether § 602’s disparate impact regulations
were consistent with its precedent holding that § 601 prohibits only
216
intentional discrimination, the Court “observ[ed] . . . how strange it
is to say that disparate-impact regulations are ‘inspired by, at the
service of, and inseparably intertwined with’ § 601, when § 601

212

Id. at 284.
Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 257 (1995); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
214
See infra text accompanying notes 334-40, 360-63, 404, 409-10.
215
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.
216
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82. But see Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note
43, at 519-20 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question
the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations because the statute’s
legislative history and subsequent related amendments support their validity);
Galalis, supra note 43, at 65, 92-101 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision
was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations
because they are entitled to deference under Chevron, because term “discrimination”
in § 602 is ambiguous, and disparate impact regulations are reasonable
interpretations of statute); Note, supra note 49, at 1781 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s
Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate
impact regulations because they deserve deference under Chevron, § 602 is
ambiguous, and disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretations and
means to effectuate § 601’s antidiscrimination requirement).
213
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permits the very behavior that the regulations forbid.” Justice Scalia
conceded that prior decisions of the Court had suggested that § 602’s
disparate impact regulations were valid. The justice stated that
“[t]hough no opinion of this Court has held that, five Justices in
Guardians voiced that view of the law at least as alternative grounds
218
for their decisions,” and that “dictum in Alexander v. Choate is to the
219
Despite this precedent, Justice Scalia argued that
same effect.”
Guardians’ and Choate’s approval of disparate impact regulations
under § 602 was “in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and
220
Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination.”
3.

Justice Stevens’ Dissenting Opinion

In a dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the Court should
consider the contemporary legal context at the time Congress
221
enacted the statute in 1964 and, therefore, interpret Title VI to
create an implied right of action for enforcing § 602 regulations
because “[a]t the time of the promulgation of these regulations,
prevailing principles of statutory construction assumed that Congress
intended a private right of action whenever such a cause of action was
222
necessary to protect individual rights granted by valid federal law.”
Additionally, while acknowledging that Cannon did not directly
address whether there was a private cause of action for § 602
disparate impact regulations, Justice Stevens argued that the Cannon
decision supported recognizing such a right because the Court had
not distinguished between intentional and unintentional
discrimination when it concluded that Congress had assumed that
there would be an implied right of action under Title IX in the face
of judicial decisions that had already recognized such a right under
223
Title VI. Justice Stevens stated:
217

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6 (quoting id. at 306-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(internal cross reference omitted).
218
Id. at 281-82 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-52 (opinion of White, J.); id. at
623 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 643-645 (Stevens, J., dissenting,)).
219
Id. at 282 (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 293, 295 n.11).
220
Id. (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-13 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)). But see supra note 216.
221
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294, 312-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context,
supra note 106, at 861-67; Short, supra note 4, at 130.
222
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra
note 106, at 861-67; Short, supra note 4, at 130.
223
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297-99, 312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank,
Context, supra note 106, at 862-63, 867. However, Justice Stevens conceded that
reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether Cannon had resolved whether Title IX
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The opinion in Cannon . . . does not draw any distinctions
between the various types of discrimination outlawed by the
operation of those statutes. . . . [I]t could hardly have been more
clear as to the scope of its holding: A private right of action exists
for “victims of the prohibited discrimination.” Not some of the
prohibited discrimination, but all of it.224

Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained that the statute and
regulations were so interconnected that it was reasonable to assume
that if Congress had intended to allow a private cause of action under
§ 601, then it was also reasonable to assume there would be a cause of
225
action under § 602.
The dissent contended that “[s]ection 601
does not stand in isolation, but rather as part of an integrated
remedial scheme. Section 602 exists for the sole purpose of
226
forwarding the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.” Justice
Stevens also argued that the Court in Lau, Guardians, and Choate, as
well as numerous lower courts, had for over thirty years consistently
approved § 602 disparate impact regulations as advancing § 601’s
antidiscrimination prohibition, even if § 602 regulations were
227
broader in some ways than those promulgated under § 601.
Justice Stevens further argued that the majority’s refusal to defer
to the agency’s § 602 regulations was contrary to the Chevron
doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an appropriate agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term such as
228
“discrimination.” Justice Stevens argued, “[i]n most other contexts,
when the agencies charged with administering a broadly-worded
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete
guidance as to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of the
statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable
229
construction of the statutory text.” Under Chevron, there is a good
contained an implied right of action for disparate impact discrimination. Sandoval,
532 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859
n.277.
224
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297-99, 312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted);
see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 862-67; Short, supra note 4, at 131.
225
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra
note 106, at 861-65; Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 242; Short, supra
note 4, at 131-32.
226
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227
Id. at 301-02, 305 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra note 106,
at 861-65; Short, supra note 4, at 132.
228
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
837); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 530 (arguing that majority
opinion in Sandoval ignored Chevron deference principle); Short, supra note 4, at
133.
229
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
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argument that courts should defer to agency interpretations of Title
VI and Title IX, because the term “discrimination” in these statutes is
230
ambiguous.
Justice Stevens contended that the majority opinion might have
little significance because, even if there was no private right of action
available to enforce § 602 regulations, a suit under § 1983 could
enforce those same regulations indirectly because of its broader
231
standards for enforcing federal rights.
However, in 2002, the
232
Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe held that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act was not privately enforceable
233
through § 1983.
The Court in Gonzaga concluded that whether
individual rights are enforceable through either § 1983 or an implied
private right of action depends on “whether Congress intended to create
234
a federal right.” Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent in Gonzaga,
which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreeing with the majority’s
premise that enforceable § 1983 rights are as limited as those in an
235
implied private right of action.
Because the Court had held in
Sandoval that only Congress can create implied rights of action, some
lower courts have interpreted Gonzaga as foreclosing § 1983 suits to
236
enforce Title VI regulations, although other lower courts have
837).
230

See Black, supra note 2, at 361-62 (arguing that agency interpretations of Title
VI deserve deference because agencies such as Department of Education possess
significant experience and expertise in applying statute); Galalis, supra note 43, at 65,
92-101 (arguing that Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations are entitled to
deference under Chevron because term “discrimination” in § 602 is ambiguous and
disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretations of statute); Note, supra
note 49, at 1781 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to
question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations because they
deserve deference under Chevron, § 602 is ambiguous, and disparate impact
regulations are reasonable interpretations and means to effectuate § 601’s
antidiscrimination requirement).
231
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Mank,
Section 1983, supra note 114, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact
regulations may be enforced through § 1983).
232
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
233
Id. at 287-91; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1450-52.
234
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1448-51.
235
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 293-303 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Gonzaga,
supra note 68, at 1453-55, 1457-58.
236
See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that § 602 regulations are not enforceable through § 1983 and stating,
“[w]e believe the Supreme Court’s Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, taken together,
compel the conclusion we reach today: that agency regulations cannot
independently create rights enforceable through § 1983”); South Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 784-90 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
§ 602 regulations are not enforceable through § 1983); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra
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237

disagreed.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens’ hope that § 1983 suits
might allow victims of discrimination to enforce § 602 disparate
impact regulations may be lost.
Sandoval did not address the disparate impact regulations issued
by agencies pursuant to § 902 of Title IX. However, given the
similarities between § 602 and § 902, it is likely that Sandoval
forecloses the possibility of a private right of action under § 902 for
238
disparate impacts.
A more difficult question is whether a suit
alleging retaliation by a school or employer is an intentional
discrimination claim consistent with § 601 or § 901, or more
analogous to a disparate impact claim pursuant to § 602 or § 902.
III. RETALIATION
A. Sullivan and Its Progeny Imply a Private Right of Action Against
Retaliation
The Supreme Court has consistently treated retaliation against
civil rights complainants as a form of intentional discrimination. The
Court has held that “retaliation offends the Constitution [because] it
threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right” and “is thus akin
to an unconstitutional condition demanded for the receipt of a
239
government-provided benefit.”
Additionally, the Court has
observed that it will recognize whatever remedies are necessary to
effectuate a statutory right, because “the existence of a statutory right
240
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.”
Specifically, the Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983 to
bar retaliation against complainants or litigants even though these
note 68, at 1467 (“In light of Gonzaga, the argument that regulations alone may
create rights enforceable through 1983 is probably untenable because a regulation
alone normally cannot provide ‘clear’ and ‘unambiguous’ evidence that Congress
intended to establish an individual right.”).
237
Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding Title VI
regulation enforceable through § 1983); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 47-54 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that properly promulgated regulations
are enforceable through § 1983, although recognizing First Circuit had never
decided issue); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1467-69.
238
See Short, supra note 4, at 133-43 (discussing whether Sandoval forecloses
possibility of private right of action under § 902).
239
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d
71, 81 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing Court’s approach to retaliation in Crawford-El).
240
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 69 (1992) (quoting Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978)); see also Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81
(discussing Supreme Court’s Franklin decision as supporting view that courts should
provide remedies in retaliation cases).
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statutes do not contain explicit prohibitions against retaliation. In
242
1969, the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, held that
243
§ 1982 implicitly prohibits retaliation. Applying similar reasoning,
244
the Court in Perry v. Sindermann held that the First Amendment
implicitly prohibits retaliation by the government against a person for
exercising his constitutional right of free speech, even if the plaintiff
would otherwise have no right to the benefit at issue, because the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
241

See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-87
(1977) (stating that court has jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim that board of
education violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by discharging him
for exercise of free speech, even if he does not have tenure, and that plaintiff may
use § 1983 to enforce alleged constitutional right against retaliation for exercise of
free speech, but vacating and remanding to allow board of education to prove it
would have discharged plaintiff for valid reasons, even absent protected conduct by
teacher); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (determining that First
Amendment prohibits government from penalizing employee for exercising right of
free speech even if government could otherwise have denied benefits to plaintiff);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (concluding that § 1982
prohibits retaliation even though text of § 1982 does not mention retaliation); see also
Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (discussing Supreme Court’s Sullivan and Perry
decisions as supporting view that courts should interpret antidiscrimination statutes
to imply private right of action against retaliation); infra notes 242-45 and
accompanying text).
242
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
243
Id.; see also Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (discussing Supreme Court’s
Sullivan decision as supporting view that courts should interpret antidiscrimination
statutes to imply private right of action against retaliation).
244
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that First Amendment, as made enforceable
by Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, implicitly prohibits retaliation by
government to protect rights secured by statute). Several courts have applied Perry’s
anti-retaliation principles to, inter alia, § 1983, which protects both individual
constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights such as those at issue in Perry,
as well as certain federal statutory rights. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274
(determining that plaintiff may use § 1983 to enforce constitutional right against
retaliation for exercise of free speech); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.
1999) (retaliation claim under, inter alia, § 1983 and First Amendment); ACLU of
Md. v. Wicomico County, 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Retaliation by a public
official for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper.”) (citing
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th
Cir. 1989) (stating that alleged First Amendment violation, if proved, would entitle
plaintiffs to relief under § 1983); Estrada v. Gomez, No. C 96-1490 S1 (PR), 1998 WL
514068, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 1998) (“Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise
of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because retaliatory
actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights.”) (citing Perry,
408 U.S. at 597); Kohl v. Smythe, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (D. Haw. 1998) (citing
Perry for the principle that retaliation in violation of First Amendment is actionable
under § 1983); Wimer v. Holzapfel, 868 F. Supp. 844, 849-50 (E.D. Tex. 1994)
(same); Di Giovanni v. Clyde Park Dist., No. 84 C 4809, 1986 WL 12596, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 3, 1986) (same).
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infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his
interest in freedom of speech,” which right against retaliation
subsequent lower court cases have held enforceable through § 1983.
Several lower court decisions have read Sullivan and its progeny as
implying the broader proposition that other antidiscrimination
statutes should be interpreted to create an “[i]mplicit . . . cause of
action protecting people from private retaliation for refusing to
violate other people’s rights under § 1981 or for exercising their own
245
§ 1981 rights.”
B. Do Title VII’s Express Retaliation Provisions Preclude an Implicit
Right of Action Under Title VI or Title IX?
246

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) explicitly
prohibits retaliation against individuals who complain about
247
employment discrimination. By contrast, neither Title VI nor Title
IX includes an explicit anti-retaliation provision. Because Congress
initially enacted Title VI and Title VII as parts of the same act, some
courts have suggested or concluded that the absence of an explicit
anti-retaliation provision in Title VI demonstrates that Congress did
not intend to protect Title VI complainants from retaliation because
it knew how to do so by including an explicit right, as it did in Title
248
VII.
Because Title IX was modeled on Title VI and also because
245

Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to create implied private right of action against
retaliation); see also Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 324 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2003)
(stating that § 1981 “clearly established” anti-retaliation implied right of action for
purposes of qualified immunity); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 576
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding, citing Sullivan, that anti-retaliation claim is appropriate
under § 1981); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1411-13 (11th
Cir. 1998) (approving anti-retaliation claim under § 1981); Phelps v. Wichita EagleBeacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff, a white
attorney, may bring anti-retaliation action under § 1981); Skinner v. Total
Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding white employee
could bring an anti-retaliation action under § 1981); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian
Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Sullivan in concluding that §
1981 created implied private right of action against retaliation); Chandamuri v.
Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that courts
should generally interpret antidiscrimination statutes to imply private right of action
against retaliation).
246
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-4 (2000).
247
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII states in relevant part that it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for any employer to retaliate against an employee
or an applicant for employment “because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
248
See infra notes 258, 283, 297, 299, 378-79 and accompanying text.
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Congress sought to address gaps in Title VII when it enacted Title IX,
the absence of an express anti-retaliation provision in Title IX may
arguably suggest that Congress did not intend such a right of action
249
for victims of retaliation.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has recently stated that the same term or word may have different
meanings even within different parts of a complex statute such as
250
Title VII, and therefore that it is necessary to examine the context
in which a word is used before assuming that it has the same meaning
251
in different parts of the same act.
Although a word such as “retaliation” would seem to mean the
same thing when used in different statutes, because of the differences
between Title VII and Title VI or Title IX, courts should be cautious
252
in drawing parallels between these statutes.
Despite Title VII’s
explicit anti-retaliation provision, courts might still be able to
construe an implied right under Title VI or Title IX because
recipients of federal aid have voluntarily accepted financial assistance
in exchange for accepting the conditions of Title VI or Title IX’s
253
regulations, including regulations prohibiting retaliation.
Additionally, courts have interpreted Title VII itself to include an
implied right of federal workers to bring an action for retaliation,
even though the section that covers their employment does not
254
include an express provision. Thus, even to the extent that courts
should construe Title VI or Title IX in light of Title VII, there is a
strong argument in favor of implied rights of action against
255
retaliation.
C. Title VII’s Mandatory Statutory Scheme Under the Commerce Power Is
Different from Spending Clause Legislation Such as Title VI or Title
IX
To answer whether the courts should look to Title VII’s antiretaliation provision in interpreting whether Title VI or Title IX
establishes an implied right of action against retaliation, one must
first examine the broader relationship between Title VII and Titles VI
and IX. Before 1998, courts in Title VI and Title IX cases often relied
249

See infra notes 258, 283, 297, 299, 378-79 and accompanying text.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1245-46 (2004); see also
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997) (stating that term “employee”
has different meanings in different parts of Title VII).
251
General Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1246-47.
252
See infra text accompanying notes 253-55, 264-90, 298, 300, 380-82.
253
See supra notes 59-60 and infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
254
See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
255
See infra notes 384-87and accompanying text.
250
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on Title VII decisions in interpreting these somewhat different
statutes, especially in cases involving employment discrimination
256
issues. In part, courts in Title VI and Title IX cases examined Title
VII decisions for guidance, because traditionally there have been
more Title VII cases and hence more potential decisions addressing
257
various procedural or substantive issues. In particular, several Title
VI and Title IX cases involving retaliation claims cited or relied on
258
Title VII decisions.
However, in 1998, the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista
259
Independent School District, emphasized the significant differences
260
between Title VII and Title IX. In Gebser, the Court first held that a
school could be held liable for sexual harassment not directly
committed by the institution or its officers where it had notice of
alleged sexual harassment by one student against another, but failed
261
Because the
to exercise its authority to stop the harassment.
student in Gebser had not informed the school district that she was

256

Nelson v. Univ. of Maine, 923 F. Supp. 275, 279 (D. Me. 1996) (“Courts
generally look to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to supply the legal standards for both
Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims.”); see also Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90
F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Title VII standards are applicable in
Title IX employment discrimination cases); Fay, supra note 82, at 1504-05 (“Many
courts instead looked to Title VII principles in an effort to evaluate Title IX claims of
sexual harassment within schools.”); see generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental
Justice and Title VI: Making Recipient Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 787, 799-809, 815-17 (1999) (discussing similarities and differences between
Title VI and Title VII) [hereinafter Mank, Recipient Agencies].
257
See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir.
1995) (“Because the relevant case law under Title IX is relatively sparse, we apply
Title VII case law by analogy.”); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that court “can draw upon the substantial body of case law
developed under Title VII to assess the plaintiff’s [Title IX claim]”).
258
See, e.g., Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-50 (2d Cir.
1995) (discrimination and retaliation claims); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River
Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1994) (retaliation claim); Nelson, 923 F.
Supp. 275 (discrimination and retaliation claims).
259
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
260
Id. at 283-87 (discussing differences among Title VII, Title VI, and Title IX);
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1345 n.12 (11th Cir. 2002)
(discussing Gebser); Byrne, supra note 169, at 595, 620-32 (criticizing Gebser for
refusing to apply Title VII sexual harassment principles to Title IX, but
acknowledging Gebser will limit use of Title VII analogies in Title IX cases); Julie
Davis, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment in Education, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 387, 401-08 (2002) (same); Fay, supra note 82, at 1524-28 (agreeing with Gebser’s
distinction between Title VII and Title IX); Fermeen Fazal, Note, Is Actual Notice an
Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1042-43, 1062-90 (1999) (acknowledging that Gebser will limit use
of Title VII analogies in Title IX cases).
261
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288-92; see also Black, supra note 2, at 362.
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being harassed, the Court concluded that she was not entitled to
262
damages from the district.
263
In requiring actual knowledge of discrimination by a recipient,
the Gebser Court emphasized that Congress enacted both Title VI and
264
Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause power. A Spending Clause
statute like Title VI or Title IX creates a contract between the
government and the grant recipient that requires the federal funding
agency to provide adequate notice to the recipient before
terminating funding so that the recipient can be given an
265
By contrast, Congress enacted Title VII
opportunity to comply.
pursuant to its general constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause, and, therefore, Title VII applies to all covered employers
without any need for notice before a plaintiff or government agency
266
commences an employment discrimination suit.
Thus, the Gebser
Court concluded that a school district must have notice and an
opportunity to stop the alleged sexual harassment before it may be
267
held liable. The Supreme Court held that a school district can be
found liable for sexual harassment by an employee such as a teacher
or coach only if it is deliberately indifferent after a student or
268
someone else notifies it of ongoing sexual harassment. This notice
requirement and “deliberate indifference” standard is far more
stringent for Title IX plaintiffs than the proof requirements for Title
269
VII plaintiffs. After Gebser, courts are likely to be more cautious in
270
making analogies between Title VII and Titles VI and IX.
Some of the distinctions the Gebser Court made between Title VII
262

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-78, 285; see also Joslin, supra note 112, at 209.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
264
The Spending Clause states in part: “The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1; see Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12; Fay, supra note
82, at 1491-92 (discussing Gebser’s conclusion that Title IX is different from Title VII
because former statute is based on Spending Clause); Fazal, supra note 260, at 104243, 1069, 1073-74 (same).
265
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90; Byrne, supra note 169, at 599, 603-04 (discussing
Gebser’s description of Title IX as based on contract similar to Title VI); Fay, supra
note 82, at 1491 (same).
266
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90; Fay, supra note 82, at 1491-92.
267
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90.
268
Id. at 290.
269
See Byrne, supra note 169, at 618-32 (discussing and criticizing Gebser’s use of
actual notice and deliberate indifference standards because they will make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to sue and arguing that court should have applied Title VII
standards instead); Fazal, supra note 260, at 1053-71 (same).
270
See Byrne, supra note 169, at 595, 620-32; Fay, supra note 82, at 1524-28.
263
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and Title IX may help Title VI or Title IX plaintiffs argue that courts
should recognize a private right of action in cases of retaliation. For
example, the Gebser Court observed that the text and structure of
271
Title VII are markedly different than the provisions in Title IX.
These differences arguably justify a more liberal inference of private
rights of action under Title VI or Title IX. For example, Title VII
272
contains an express cause of action, and explicitly provides for a
273
damages remedy, but courts have recognized a private right of
action and remedies against intentional discrimination under both
Title VI and Title IX despite the absence of any express statutory
274
language.
Thus, the fact that Title VII contains an express antiretaliation provision does not necessarily preclude courts from
enforcing a private right under Title VI and Title IX. Additionally,
275
although Congress enacted Title VI and Title VII in the same Act, it
has subsequently amended Title VII, as well as Titles VI and IX, in
ways that accentuate their differences. For instance, when Congress
enacted Title IX in 1972, Title VII did not provide for recovery of
276
monetary damages, but allowed only injunctive and equitable relief.
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide for a damages
277
remedy, but did not similarly amend Title VI or Title IX.
In some, but not all respects, Title VI and Title IX are arguably
broader in coverage than Title VII, as to which Congress has adopted
a number of limitations. In a dissenting opinion in Gebser, Justice
Stevens observed that “the use of passive verbs in Title IX, focusing
on the victim of the discrimination rather than the particular
278
wrongdoer, gives this statute broader coverage than Title VII.”
Additionally, there are good policy arguments for interpreting Title
VII more narrowly than Title VI or Title IX, because Title VII applies
to a wider range of entities than the latter statutes. Title VII applies
271

See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12; see generally Mank,
Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at 799-809, 815-17 (discussing similarities and
differences between Title VI and Title VII).
272
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283.
273
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283.
274
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S.
60, 68-73 (1992) (implying Title IX damages remedy); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717
(finding implied private right of action for Title IX and suggesting similar right of
action for Title VI).
275
See supra text accompanying note 248; infra notes 297, 299, 378-79 and
accompanying text.
276
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285-86 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970), §
2000e-5(e), (g) (Supp. II 1970)).
277
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)).
278
Id. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp.,
128 F.3d 1014, 1047 (7th Cir. 1997) (Rovner, J., dissenting)).
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to all firms above a certain size in the private labor market.
By
contrast, Title VI and Title IX are binding on only those parties who
280
voluntarily accept federal aid.
Perhaps because Title VII is
mandatory, while Titles VI and IX are voluntary, only Title VII
explicitly acknowledges that defendants have affirmative defenses
that may justify disparate impacts, and that employers are not
required to hire either women or minorities to precisely reflect their
281
percentage of the population.
D. Title IX’s Anti-Retaliation Provision Differs from Title VII’s
Because there are significant differences between Titles VI and
282
IX and Title VII, one must be cautious in applying Title VII’s antiretaliation provision to either Title VI or Title IX retaliation
complaints. Before the Gebser decision in 1998, lower courts had
divided about whether retaliation allegations by Title VI or Title IX
plaintiffs should be analyzed under Title VII or under the
283
antidiscrimination principles of Title VI or Title IX. Several courts
had applied Title VII principles to Title IX retaliation cases because
courts had found Title VII to be a useful model in other types of Title
284
VI and Title IX cases. Those decisions are now questionable.
Even before the Court decided Gebser, in Lowrey v. Texas A&M
285
University System, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had determined that the explicit anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII was different and separate from the anti-retaliation

279

See Fisher, supra note 53, at 320; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at 816;
Watson, supra note 54, at 971-73; Sonn, supra note 55, at 1596; see generally Gebser, 524
U.S. at 286-87 (discussing difference between Title VII generally applying to all
employment relationships, if employer is above certain size, and Title IX applying
only where recipient has voluntarily accepted funds from federal government).
280
See supra note 279.
281
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at
816.
282
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86 (concluding explicit remedies in Title VII are
different from arguably implicit remedies in Title VI); Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12
(same); see generally Franklin, 911 F.2d at 622 (rejecting the application of Title VII
standards to a Title IX claim concluding, “[w]e do not believe applying Title VII to
Title IX would result in the kind of orderly analysis so necessary in this confusing
area of law.”), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra
note 258, at 799-809, 815-17 (discussing similarities and differences between Titles VI
and VII). But see Nelson, 923 F. Supp. at 279-80 (concluding that retaliation claims
are similar under Titles VII and IX).
283
See Heckman, supra note 7, at 595-610 (discussing Title IX retaliation cases) &
n.314 (listing Title IX retaliation cases); infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
284
See supra note 258 and cases cited therein.
285
117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
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286

principles implicit in Title IX.
The court first concluded that the
express anti-retaliation provision in Title VII prohibited retaliation
against only those individuals who have complained of employment
287
discrimination as defined by that statute.
The Fifth Circuit then
determined that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision did not preempt
retaliation claims resulting from complaints about discrimination as
defined by Title IX, which has a significantly different definition of
288
discrimination than Title VII. Thus, the plaintiff’s contention that
she was denied a promotion because she complained that the
defendant had misallocated resources between male and female
athletes was within the realm of Title IX’s anti-retaliation provision,
289
not Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
Although it concluded that Title IX did not establish a private
290
cause of action for employment discrimination, the Fifth Circuit
held that the statute did implicitly authorize a private action for
retaliation claims under the Department of Education’s Title IX antiretaliation regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e). At the time, in 1997, the
Fifth Circuit recognized that it was appropriate to infer a private right
of action from administrative regulations as long as the underlying
291
statute itself contained an implied right of action.
Applying the
292
four-part Cort test, the Fifth Circuit held that the regulation implied
a private right of action narrowly tailored to those employees who
293
suffer retaliation solely as a result of a Title IX complaint. The Fifth
Circuit remanded the claim to the district court, which subsequently
294
The
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove retaliation.
Gebser decision’s emphasis on the differences between Titles VII and
IX supports the reasoning in Lowrey, which treats the two statutes
differently. After Sandoval, however, Lowrey’s use of the regulations

286

Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 249 (“[T]he anti-retaliation provisions of titles VII and IX
are not identical, and title VII provides no remedy for retaliation against individuals
who raise charges of noncompliance with the substantive provisions of title IX.”).
287
Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247-49.
288
Id. at 248-49.
289
Id. at 244, 247-49; see also Heckman, supra note 7, at 596-98.
290
Id. at 247 (“In Lakoski, we held that title VII provides the exclusive remedy for
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally
funded educational institutions. . . . Title IX does not afford a private right of action
for employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational
institutions.”).
291
Id. at 250 n.10.
292
See supra note 114.
293
Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 250-54.
294
See Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 11 F. Supp. 2d 895, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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alone to establish a private right of action may be untenable.
IV. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER RETALIATION

A. The Eleventh Circuit Holds Title IX Does Not Authorize a Private
Right of Action for Retaliation Claims
1.

Jackson Follows Sandoval’s Textualist Approach

In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the fact that Congress had expressly prohibited
retaliation in the text of Title VII, but had not done so in either Title
VI or Title IX, as an indication that Congress may not have intended
the term “discrimination” in Title VI or Title IX to include a private
296
right of action in cases of retaliation. In light of Gebser, the Jackson
decision acknowledged that there are significant differences between
Title VII and Title IX:
We recognize that Title VII is of limited usefulness in interpreting
Title IX, both because Title VII was enacted pursuant to
Congress’s Commerce power, while both Title VI and IX were
enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power, and
because the text and structure of Title VII are markedly different
than that of Title IX.297

Despite these differences, the Eleventh Circuit cautiously
concluded that “the fact that Congress felt required to prohibit
retaliation expressly under Title VII may indicate that Congress did
not intend the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Title IX to be read
298
sufficiently broadly to cover retaliation.” By using the phrase “may
indicate,” the Jackson court implicitly acknowledged that the presence
of an explicit anti-retaliation provision in Title VII does not
necessarily preclude an inferred right against retaliation under Title
299
IX.
The Jackson court relied on Sandoval’s textualist approach to
analyzing private rights of action in deciding whether Title IX implies
300
a private right of action against retaliation.
The Eleventh Circuit
emphasized the lack of any textual support for such a right of action
under Title IX. As the court stated, “[o]ur task, as Sandoval makes
295
296
297
298
299
300

See supra notes 200-04 and infra notes 306-07, 310-11 and accompanying text.
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12.
Id. (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286).
Id. (emphasis added).
See infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 302-03, 322 and accompanying text.
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clear, is to interpret what Congress actually said, not to guess from
congressional silence what it might have meant. The absence of any
mention of retaliation in Title IX therefore weighs powerfully against
a finding that Congress intended Title IX to reach retaliatory
301
conduct.”
Applying a textualist approach, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that “[b]ecause the text thus evinces no concern with
retaliation, we are not free to imply a private right of action to redress
302
it.”
Yet the Cannon decision had recognized an implied private
right of action at least for intentional discrimination under both Title
VI and Title IX. And more recently, in Gebser and Davis, the Supreme
Court has recognized a limited right to sue school districts if they are
303
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment. Thus, the Court has
sometimes recognized a private right of action despite the absence of
304
any textual support.
Additionally, following Sandoval’s conclusion that § 602
regulations do not create a private right of action because they are
“concerned exclusively with the power of federal agencies to regulate
recipients of federal funds,” the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
“[s]ection 902 plainly does not disclose any congressional intent to
imply a private right of action of any kind, let alone against
305
retaliation.”
According to the Jackson court, the anti-retaliation
regulations issued pursuant to § 902 could not establish a private
right of action because “§ 902, like its twin § 602, is devoid of ‘rightscreating’ language of any kind—whether against gender
306
discrimination, retaliation, or any other kind of harm.” The focus
of § 902 is exclusively on the role of federal agencies in enforcing the
307
antidiscrimination principles in § 901.
Furthermore, because
Congress explicitly established § 902’s administrative enforcement
mechanism and § 903’s judicial review provisions for recipients, but
provided no similar express statutory remedies for retaliation victims,
the Jackson court concluded that it was unlikely that Congress had
intended to create a private right of action in cases of retaliation
because “the express provision of one method of enforcing a
301

Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1344-45.
Id. at 1346.
303
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser,
524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also Black, supra note 2, at 362-63; supra notes 268-69 and
infra notes 312-14, 405-08 and accompanying text.
304
See supra text accompanying notes 128, 274, 300 and infra text accompanying
notes 388, 405-08.
305
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345.
306
Id.
307
Id.
302
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substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude
308
others.”
Moreover, the Jackson court concluded that the regulation’s
prohibition against retaliation does not create a private right of
action because, as Sandoval had determined, “language in a
309
regulation . . . may not create a right that Congress has not.” From
Sandoval’s reasoning that only Congress may create a private right of
action and that an agency may not establish such a right through a
regulation, the Eleventh Circuit determined that “[b]ecause
Congress has not created a right through Title IX to redress harms
resulting from retaliation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) may not be read to
310
create one either.” However, as discussed below, in two important
311
312
Title IX cases, Gebser and Davis, the Court did consider agency
regulations when interpreting Title IX in holding that schools
receiving federal funds were liable if they were deliberately
313
indifferent to student complaints of sexual harassment.
Even if
agency regulations may not establish new rights, the Fourth Circuit in
Peters v. Jenney appropriately observed that agency regulations
314
interpreting a statute deserve some deference under Chevron.
2.

Jackson Holds That Title IX Only Protects Direct
Victims of Discrimination from Retaliation

Even if Title IX created a private right of action against
retaliation, the Jackson court concluded that Title IX only protects
direct victims of gender discrimination from retaliation, and,
therefore, does not authorize a private right of action by a person
who alleges retaliation by his employer because he complained about
315
gender discrimination against another.
Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that the plaintiff, Roderick Jackson, was “not
316
within the class meant to be protected by Title IX.”
The Jackson
court observed that the text of § 901 only “identifies victims of

308

Id. (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1346 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
310
Id.
311
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
312
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
313
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also Black, supra
note 2, at 362-63; supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
notes 388, 405-08.
314
See Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 315-16, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2003).
315
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1346.
316
Id.
309
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gender discrimination as the class it aims to benefit.”
The court
acknowledged that “[g]ender discrimination affects not only its direct
victims, but also those who care for, instruct, or are affiliated with
them—parents, teachers, coaches, friends, significant others, and
318
coworkers.”
Because Congress had not expressly provided to
protect indirect victims of gender discrimination from retaliation, the
Jackson court concluded that such indirect victims have no right to
319
complain against retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit determined that
“[w]e are not free to extend the scope of Title IX protection beyond
the boundaries Congress meant to establish, and we thus may not
read Title IX so broadly as to cover anyone other than direct victims
320
of gender discrimination.”
Relying exclusively on a textualist
analysis, the court held that there is no private right of action against
retaliation, especially for a person such as the plaintiff: “[O]ur review
of both the text and structure of Title IX yields no congressional
intent to create a cause of action for retaliation, particularly for a
321
plaintiff who is not a direct victim of gender discrimination.”
Jackson’s limitation of retaliation actions to actual victims of
322
discrimination is contrary to Sullivan and its progeny.
Furthermore, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects anyone
who complains of discrimination and not just those who assert that
323
they are the victims of discrimination.
Additionally, several other
antidiscrimination statutes also protect all persons from retaliation,
324
and not just those who are victims of discrimination.
Although
317

Id.
Id.
319
Id. at 1346-47.
320
Id. at 1347.
321
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1347-48.
322
See supra notes 35-36, 239-45 and infra notes 328, 332, 342-45, 347-54, 366-71,
374-77, 389-93 and accompanying text.
323
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (Title VII); Hazel v. U.S. Postmaster
Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
protects all who complain of discrimination, not just victims); Reply to Brief in
Opposition, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672,
2003 WL 22428037 (S. Ct. July 25, 2003) [hereinafter “Reply Brief”].
324
Some statutes contain anti-retaliation provisions expressly protecting all
persons from retaliation. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12203(a), (b) (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(2000); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000); see also Reply
Brief, supra note 323, at 6 n.3. Several lower court decisions have interpreted the
anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
(2000), to protect all complainants and not just those with a substantive claim. See,
e.g., Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); EEOC v.
Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters.,
318
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325

neither Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the anti-retaliation
326
327
nor Sullivan
provisions in other antidiscrimination statutes,
directly controls the meaning of any similar protections judicially
implied under Title VI or Title IX, the fact that Title VII and other
antidiscrimination statutes protect all persons from retaliation
suggests, but admittedly is not conclusive, that Congress intended
328
comparable protections for Title VI or Title IX.
B. Cases Holding There Is a Private Right of Action Under Title VI or
Title IX for Retaliation
1.

The Fourth Circuit Recognizes a Private Right of
Action for Retaliation under Title VI and Rejects
Jackson
329

In Peters v. Jenney, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the absence of an explicit prohibition against retaliation in Title VI
does not “lead to an inference that Congress did not mean to
prohibit retaliation in § 601” because “relevant precedent
interpreting similarly worded antidiscrimination statutes” construed
330
“discrimination” to include “retaliation.”
The Peters decision
interpreted the text of Title VI in light of how courts have interpreted
similar antidiscrimination statutes, especially in Sullivan and its
331
progeny.
Additionally, pursuant to Chevron, the Fourth Circuit
deferred to agency regulations interpreting the statute as prohibiting
332
In light of Sandoval’s holding that Congress intended
retaliation.
Title VI to prohibit only intentional discrimination, the Peters decision
recognized a private cause of action only for those who allege that a
recipient retaliated against them for complaining about intentional
333
discrimination. Peters did not recognize a private right of action for
retaliation on behalf of those complaining that a recipient had
engaged in practices causing disparate impacts that are forbidden by
881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 6 n.3.
325
See supra notes 247-90, 298-300 and infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text.
326
See supra notes 239-45 and infra notes 345-54, 368 and accompanying text.
327
See supra notes 35-36, 239-45 and accompanying text; infra Parts IV.B & C.
328
See Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 6; supra text accompanying notes 254-55, 32328; infra text accompanying notes 384-88.
329
327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
330
Id. at 316-17. The Fourth Circuit also held that the plaintiff could pursue a
First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 319-24. The First Amendment issues are
beyond the scope of this article.
331
See id. at 316-19.
332
Id. at 315-16, 318-19.
333
Id. at 319 & n.11.
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334

various agency regulations.
Because Sandoval rejected private rights of action to enforce an
agency’s disparate impact regulations under § 602, the Peters court
recognized that a key question was whether regulations prohibiting
retaliation, such as 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), are “an interpretation of §
601’s core antidiscrimination mandate” or § 602 regulations that go
335
beyond § 601.
The Sandoval Court, acknowledging that the § 602
regulations would establish a private right of action to the extent that
they effectuated § 601’s prohibition against intentional
discrimination, stated that “[w]e do not doubt that regulations
applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the
cause of action to enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and
336
reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself . . . .”
According to the Fourth Circuit, “[i]f § 100.7(e) is an interpretation
of § 601 that is valid under Chevron, it commands deference and may
337
be enforced via an implied private right of action.”
On the other
hand, if § 100.7(e) is a § 602 regulation that prohibits nonintentional conduct, then courts may not allow plaintiffs to file an
338
implied private right of action to enforce the regulation.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that § 100.7(e) serves § 601’s
339
prohibition against intentional discrimination.
The Peters court
determined that other decisions interpreting similarly worded
antidiscrimination statutes had construed “discrimination” to include
340
“retaliation.”
For example, in the 1969 Sullivan decision, the
Supreme Court determined that § 1982, which grants to all citizens
the same rights to buy or sell property “as is enjoyed by white
citizens,” implicitly prohibited retaliation against a white man who
was expelled from a neighborhood board for attempting to sell
341
property to a black man. Section 1982 is similar to § 601 in that it
does not contain an explicit anti-retaliation provision. The Sullivan
Court concluded that the white plaintiff who was expelled “for the
advocacy of [a black man’s] cause” could bring a private right of

334

Id.
Peters, 327 F.3d at 316.
336
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284.
337
Peters, 327 F.3d at 316.
338
Id. In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit stated that “[t]o the extent that [plaintiff]
cannot show an implied right of action to enforce the retaliation regulations, § 1983
does not provide [her] with a cause of action.” Id. n.9.
339
Id. at 316-19.
340
Id.
341
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).
335
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342

action under § 1982.
The Supreme Court stated that “[i]f that
sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed, then
[the plaintiff] is punished for trying to vindicate the rights of
minorities protected by § 1982. . . . [T]here can be no question but
343
that [the plaintiff]” may maintain an action under § 1982.
The
Fourth Circuit interpreted Sullivan as authorizing courts to read
antidiscrimination statutes as generally implying a prohibition against
retaliation on behalf of those who oppose the prohibited
discrimination. Additionally, applying Sullivan’s reasoning, the
Fourth Circuit held that § 1981, which like § 601 prohibits only
intentional discrimination and does not explicitly prohibit
344
retaliation, establishes an implied right of action against retaliation.
2.

The Fourth Circuit Declines to Limit the Right of
Action to Direct Victims of Discrimination, Rejecting
Jackson

In dissent, Judge Widener agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Jackson. Judge Widener argued that, even if § 601
contains an implicit right of action against retaliation, the plaintiff in
Peters, who was not a direct victim of discrimination, but rather
reported such discrimination against others, could not file a private
action because she was not a member of the class for whose benefit
345
Congress had enacted § 601.
The majority disagreed, because
346
Sullivan and Fourth Circuit precedent had allowed persons who
were not members of the protected class to file retaliation claims in
both § 1981 and § 1982 cases if they suffered retaliation for actions
347
opposing discrimination prohibited by the statute. The Peters court
cited decisions from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits that had followed
Sullivan in allowing plaintiffs who are not direct victims of
348
discrimination to bring retaliation claims under § 1981.
In a
342

Id.
Id. at 237.
344
Peters, 327 F.3d at 317 (citing Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d
1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) and Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 576
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding, based on Sullivan, that retaliation is a viable theory under §
1981)).
345
Id. at 324-26 (Widener, J., dissenting).
346
Id. at 317 (citing Fiedler, 631 F.2d at 1149 n.7; Johnson, 215 F.3d at 576 (holding,
based on Sullivan, that retaliation is a viable theory under § 1981)).
347
Id.
348
Id. at 317-18 (citing Johnson, 215 F.3d at 576 (Sixth Circuit holding that white
plaintiff allegedly retaliated against for opposing discrimination of others may bring
suit under § 1981); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir.
1989) (ruling that plaintiff, a white attorney, who was allegedly subjected to adverse
343

98

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:047

footnote, the court observed that the Jackson decision had not
addressed Sullivan and its progeny in deciding that only persons who
were victims of prohibited discrimination may file retaliation
349
claims.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that § 601, like § 1981 and §
1982, did not contain an express provision allowing retaliation
350
claims.
The Sullivan line of cases, however, had allowed implied
351
retaliation claims under §§ 1981 and 1982.
Additionally, agencies
352
Under the Chevron
had interpreted § 601 to prohibit retaliation.
deference principle and in light of Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that it should defer to the agency regulations interpreting
§ 601 to prohibit retaliation because they served the statute’s “core
prohibition” against “intentional racial discrimination,” and
“[r]etaliation of this sort bears such a symbiotic and inseparable
relationship to intentional racial discrimination that an agency could
reasonably conclude that Congress meant to prohibit both, and to
353
provide a remedy for victims of either.”
One weakness in the Fourth Circuit’s Chevron analysis is the
distinction between a regulation that merely interprets a statutory
right and one that creates or “effectuates” rights based on the general
354
goals of a statute.
Although the Supreme Court’s view is not
completely clear on this point, a narrow view of the Chevron doctrine
is that the deference principle applies to agency interpretations of
statutory rights, but arguably not agency regulations that go beyond a
355
statute to effectuate the statute’s general goals. The Department of
Education has explicitly stated that the purpose of the anti-retaliation
356
The Peters
regulation is “to effectuate the provisions of Title VI.”
court, however, appropriately recognized that the anti-retaliation
action because of his representation of black clients, may maintain action under §
1981 if he can show that he was deprived of an interest protected by § 1981); Skinner
v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that white
employee allegedly terminated for assisting a discriminated-against black employee
could maintain an action under § 1981)).
349
Id. at 318 n.10.
350
Peters, 327 F.3d at 317-18; see also supra Part III.B and notes 7, 14, 18, 330-31 and
accompanying text.
351
See Peters, 327 F.3d at 317-18; supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 239-45, 328,
332, 342-45, 347-50, and infra Part IV.B.4 and text accompanying notes 353-54, 37477, 389-93.
352
Peters, 327 F.3d at 318; see also supra notes 15, 21, 59-60, 289, 291 and infra note
357 and accompanying text.
353
Peters, 327 F.3d at 318-19 (citation omitted).
354
See Gorod, supra note 16, at 943 n.30, 945-46 nn.40-42.
355
Id. at 946 n.42.
356
34 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2004); see also Gorod, supra note 16, at 946 n.42.
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regulation, at least implicitly, can be used to interpret Title IX. The
court was thus ultimately correct that the regulation deserves Chevron
357
deference.
3.

In Light of Sandoval, Peters Limits Retaliation Claims to
Intentional Discrimination

Although the plaintiff contended that all retaliation is inherently
intentional, the Fourth Circuit concluded “that ‘retaliation’ exists
conceptually only by reference to the acts which form the basis for it.
Terminating an employee because she opposes practices which have
358
nothing to do with Title VI is not Title VI retaliation.”
In light of
Sandoval’s holding that there is no implied right of action to enforce
359
§ 602’s disparate impact regulations, the Peters court concluded that
Title VI authorizes an implied right of action for retaliation in favor
of only those who claim they have suffered because they opposed the
type of intentional discrimination that is at the core of § 601’s
360
antidiscrimination purpose.
After Sandoval, there is no implied
right of action for those who allege disparate impact discrimination,
or, by implication, those who are retaliated against for complaining
361
of such discrimination. The Fourth Circuit stated, “Insofar as they
forbid retaliation for opposing disparate impact practices not
actionable under § 601, the regulations may not be enforced either
362
via the § 601 private right of action or § 1983.”
Because the district court had simply dismissed the plaintiff’s
retaliation claims without deciding whether the alleged retaliation
resulted from her opposition to intentional or unintentional
discrimination, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether the plaintiff had a valid
363
retaliation case. The Peters court summarized the standard that the
district court should apply as requiring the plaintiff to “show that she
believed, in good faith and with objective reasonableness, that she
was opposing intentional discrimination of the sort that § 601
364
forbids.”
357
358
359
360
361
362
363

364

See Gorod, supra note 16, at 946 n.42.
Peters, 327 F.3d at 319 n.11.
See supra text accompanying notes 12, 39, 185, 195-211.
Peters, 327 F.3d at 319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319-20, 323-24.
Id. at 323-24. The court had earlier explained the standard as follows:
To make a claim for Title VI retaliation, [plaintiff] must show (1) that
she engaged in protected activity; (2) that [defendants] took a material
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District Court Decisions Agreeing with Peters

After the Peters decision, federal district court decisions from the
District of Columbia and the Western District of Kentucky agreed
with Peters that Sullivan and its progeny were the most relevant and
appropriate precedent concerning whether § 601 or § 901 prohibits
365
366
retaliation.
In Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky observed
that “both Sullivan and Perry involved antidiscrimination statutes [42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, respectively], written at the same level of
367
generality as Title IX.”
The Galen court concluded that there was
an implicit right against retaliation in Title IX because such
protection is necessary to effectuate the statute’s ban on intentional
368
369
discrimination.
Likewise, in Chandamuri v. Georgetown University,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia followed
Peters and Sullivan in holding that § 601 contains an implied right
370
against retaliation.
C. Mock v. South Dakota Board of Trustees: The Case Against Peters
and For Jackson
371

In Mock v. South Dakota Board of Regents, the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota agreed with the
adverse employment action against her, and (3) that a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse
action. . . . As in other civil rights contexts, to show “protected activity,”
the plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case need “only . . . prove that he
opposed an unlawful employment practice which he reasonably
believed had occurred or was occurring.” The inquiry is therefore (1)
whether [plaintiff] “subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed” that the
district had engaged in a practice violative of § 601, and (2) whether
this belief “was objectively reasonable in light of the facts,” a standard
which we will refer to as one of “reasonable belief.”
Id. at 320 (citations and footnotes omitted).
365
Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 83 (D.D.C. 2003);
Johnson v. Galen Health Insts., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679, 695-98 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
366
267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
367
Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (discussing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972)). Perry involved the First Amendment, but subsequent cases concluded it
logically applied to § 1983. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
368
Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 697. Because prohibiting retaliation is strongly
consistent with Title IX’s antidiscrimination purpose, the Galen decision agreed with
the Fourth Circuit’s Peters decision that the Department of Education’s regulation
prohibiting retaliation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), deserved deference under Chevron.
Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98.
369
274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003).
370
Id. at 83.
371
267 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2003).
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Eleventh Circuit in Jackson that Title IX does not establish a private
372
The Mock decision raised four
right of action for retaliatory acts.
difficulties with the reasoning in Peters. It is useful to examine these
four arguments to gain a better understanding of whether the Peters
or Jackson decision makes a stronger case for recognizing or denying
an implied right of action for retaliation under Title VI or Title IX.
The first argument in Mock is that when Congress enacted Title
VI in 1964 it could not have assumed that the courts would find an
implied private right of action for retaliation because the Sullivan
case had not yet been decided. The Mock court argued that “it
cannot be said that in enacting Title VI, Congress had in mind that
courts would imply a cause of action for retaliation under Title VI
based upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Sullivan of a
373
similarly worded antidiscrimination statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982.”
Although it is true that Sullivan had not yet been decided in 1964, the
Court had recently decided Borak when Congress enacted Title VI. If
the contemporary legal context in which Congress enacted a statute
matters, then that argument strongly cuts in favor of reading implied
rights of action broadly in statutes enacted from the time of Borak in
374
1964 until Cort was decided in 1975.
Thus, applying a
contemporary context approach to statutory interpretation, courts
should liberally construe private rights of action under both Title VI
375
and Title IX.
On the other hand, the Sandoval Court refused to
apply the contemporary context approach to statutory interpretation
376
and instead focused on Title VI’s text in interpreting the statute.
Following Sandoval’s textualist reasoning, the fact that Sullivan had
not yet been decided is less important than the meaning of Title VI’s
language.
Applying Justice Scalia’s textualist approach in Sandoval, the key
issue is whether Title VI’s antidiscrimination language prohibiting
intentional discrimination reasonably implies a right of action on
behalf of those who allegedly suffer retaliation because they complain
about intentional discrimination by a recipient of federal funding. If
Title VI’s text supports a private right of action against retaliation,
then the fact that the Court decided Sullivan after the enactment of
Title VI is irrelevant. Under either a contemporary context approach
to interpretation or a textualist approach, Mock’s first objection, that
372
373
374
375
376

Id. at 1020-22.
Id. at 1020.
See supra notes 108-12, 127-30, 221-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108-12, 127-30, 221-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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Sullivan came after Title VI, is not very persuasive. Of course,
Congress did enact Title IX in 1972, three years after the Court
decided Sullivan. Therefore, under the Mock court’s reasoning, there
is a stronger case for implying an anti-retaliation right of action
under Title IX.
The second argument in Mock is that the Peters decision failed to
address the [negative] inference of Congress’ intent that can be
drawn from Congress’ explicit grant of a cause of action for
retaliation in Title VII, and Congress’ failure to explicitly grant a
cause of action for retaliation in Title VI, when both Title VII and
Title VI were enacted as part of the same act, the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.377

Conversely, the Mock court argued that the Eleventh Circuit in
Jackson had appropriately drawn a negative inference from the
absence of explicit anti-retaliation language in Title IX or Title VI,
despite acknowledging the differences between these statutes and
378
Title VII.
In light of the Supreme Court’s emphasizing in Gebser that there
are substantial differences between the “text and structure” of Title
379
VII and Title IX, the Eleventh Circuit in Jackson acknowledged that
the absence of an explicit retaliation provision in Title VI or Title IX
was not conclusive evidence, but merely “may indicate” that Congress
380
did not intend to allow retaliation suits. The Mock court’s argument
that courts should not imply a private right of action in Title VI
because there is an explicit right of action in Title VII is inconsistent
with the rationale of Cannon and Guardians, which recognized that
Title VI, as well as Title IX, created an implied private right of action
381
at least for plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination.
Because
Cannon and Guardians recognized that an implied right of action was
appropriate under Title VI and Title IX to enable plaintiffs to
382
challenge intentional discrimination,
it is also appropriate to
acknowledge a private right of action for plaintiffs alleging
retaliation, as long as retaliation is considered a type of intentional
discrimination at the core of the antidiscrimination principles of §§
601 and 901.
377

Mock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 (citations omitted).
Id.
379
See supra notes 259-60, 264-77, 282 and accompanying text.
380
See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
381
See supra notes 10, 116, 123-26, 135-39, 141-46, 159, 166, 168-69, 172 and
accompanying text.
382
See supra notes 10, 116, 123-26, 135-39, 141-46, 159, 166, 168-69, 172 and
accompanying text.
378
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Courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit retaliation even
where it does not expressly do so. In 1972, Congress amended Title
VII to include federal employees, but did not expressly incorporate
383
the statute’s anti-retaliation provision into its new section.
Nevertheless, even without express language, lower courts have
consistently held that Title VII protects federal workers from
384
retaliation.
Furthermore, courts have interpreted the Age
385
Discrimination in Employment Act to protect federal employees
386
from retaliation despite the absence of an express provision.
Accordingly, the Mock court’s argument based on Title VII is not
decisive in light of how courts have sometimes recognized implied
rights in Title VII despite the absence of explicit statutory language
and also because the Supreme Court in Gebser treated Title IX, and
thus implicitly Title VI in some respects, as quite different in this
387
regard from Title VII.
According to the Mock court, the remaining flaws in the
reasoning of Peters were, on the one hand, the court’s failure to follow
the approach for determining implied private rights of action used in
Sandoval, and, on the other hand, the Peters court’s reliance on the
388
outdated Borak analysis applied in Sullivan and its progeny.
The
Mock court argued that Sandoval’s intent-based analysis of implied
rights of action had implicitly rejected Sullivan’s approach, which was
based on Borak’s out-dated assumption that remedies are implied
389
whenever they serve a statute’s purposes.
The Peters court had criticized the Jackson court for failing to
address Sullivan and its progeny. The Mock court, however, asserted
that in Jackson the Eleventh Circuit had appropriately discussed the
Supreme Court’s shift to an almost exclusive focus on whether
390
Congress intended to create a private right of action.
The Mock
court concluded that Peters had inappropriately relied on Sullivan and
391
that the Eleventh Circuit had instead correctly followed Sandoval.
383

See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 717, as added Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111
(1972) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2000)).
384
See, e.g., Aronberg v. Walters, 755 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1985); Canino v.
EEOC, 707 F.2d 468, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1983); Cert. Petition, supra note 3, at 15; see
also supra note 254 and accompanying text.
385
29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
386
See, e.g., Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 958 (2002); Cert. Petition, supra note 3, at 14.
387
See supra text accompanying notes 259-60, 264-77, 282, 380.
388
Mock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-91).
389
Id. (citations omitted).
390
Id.
391
Id. at 1020-22.
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V. CONCLUSION: PETERS’ RELIANCE ON SULLIVAN AND ITS PROGENY IS
MORE PERSUASIVE THAN JACKSON’S READING OF SANDOVAL’S DICTA
A. Sandoval Did Not Overrule the Anti-Retaliation Principles in
Sullivan and Its Progeny
Contrary to the Mock court’s analysis, the Sullivan decision
survives Sandoval to the extent that the former case recognizes a
private right of action for plaintiffs who suffer retaliation for
protesting intentional discrimination, but not for those who suffer
retaliation for criticizing disparate impact discrimination. Even if the
Sullivan decision was based in part on the now discredited “purposive
approach” to implied private rights of action of Borak, the core
principle in Sullivan’s analysis that Congress, when it enacts
antidiscrimination statutes, generally intends to prohibit retaliation
392
against all those who complain about discrimination, remains valid.
Hence, the Jackson and Mock decisions erred in reading Sandoval too
broadly and in reaching the erroneous conclusion that there cannot
be an implied right to sue for retaliatory conduct.
In dicta, the Sandoval decision suggested the view that only
Congress may establish individual rights, and hence, that only explicit
393
statutory language can create a private right of action.
However,
any implication in Sandoval that only express statutory language may
establish a private right of action is contrary to the Court’s precedent
394
and Sandoval never purported to overrule that precedent.
The
Sandoval decision did not reject implied rights of action in all
circumstances, but held only that Title VI disparate impact
regulations that exceed § 601’s prohibition against intentional
395
discrimination may not establish such a right.
Even though § 601
does not explicitly provide for a private right of action, the Sandoval
decision recognized that, in light of Cannon and Guardians, § 601
creates an implied right of action for victims of intentional
396
discrimination.
Thus, Sandoval did not hold that a private right of
action must always be explicit in the text of a statute and implicitly
acknowledged that the Court would recognize implied rights of

392

See Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 4.
See supra notes 30-31, and accompanying text; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra
note 68, at 1461.
394
See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 244.
395
See Black, supra note 2, at 363 & n.42; supra notes 30-32, 189, 195, 209-14 and
accompanying text.
396
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293
(1985); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11); see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26.
393
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action if there was sufficient evidence in the statute that Congress
397
intended to create a private right.
B. The Chevron Deference Doctrine Supports Peters
Pursuant to the Chevron doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Peters
appropriately deferred to the Department of Education’s antiretaliation provision in 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), as an indication of how
398
to interpret the statute.
Agency regulations interpreting a statute
deserve some Chevron deference, and courts should defer to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, unless the
regulations establish new rights not provided by the statute. Several
lower court decisions have applied Chevron deference to Title VI and
399
Title IX regulations.
Chevron deference to agency regulations is
400
limited, however, if a statute is unambiguous.
Accordingly, the
Sandoval decision did not defer to the agency’s § 602 disparate impact
regulations in interpreting whether Title VI authorizes a private right
of action because the Court had unambiguously interpreted § 601 to
401
prohibit only intentional discrimination. Because § 602 regulations
effectuate the antidiscrimination purposes of § 601, the Sandoval
Court concluded that the § 602 regulations could not establish a right
402
broader than the prohibition in § 601. Similarly, Peters recognized
an implied right against retaliation only for those who suffer
retaliation because they have challenged intentional discrimination
403
prohibited by § 601.
397

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-87; see also supra notes 31-34, 212-13, 394-96 and
accompanying text.
398
See supra notes 21, 38, 315, 333, 338-42, 354-58 and accompanying text.
399
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1032-34 (9th Cir.
1998) (“We are aware of no reported decision addressing the circumstances under
which a school district’s failure to respond to racial harassment . . . by other students
constitutes a violation of Title VI. However, the Department of Education in 1994
interpreted Title VI as prohibiting student-to-student racial harassment . . . .”);
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 406 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Although
[the Department] [of Education] is not a party to this appeal, we must accord its
interpretation of Title IX appreciable deference [under Chevron].”) (first alteration
in original); Rowinsky v. Bryan PSD, 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“[W]hen interpreting title IX, we accord the OCR’s [Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Education] interpretations appreciable deference.”); Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (“We treat [the Department of Education],
acting through its OCR, as the administrative agency charged with administering
Title IX.”); see also Black, supra note 2, at 361-62, 377 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s use
of Chevron doctrine in Monteiro).
400
See supra notes 20, 356 and accompanying text.
401
See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
402
See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text.
403
See supra notes 22-23, 334-35, 361-63 and accompanying text.
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has deferred to Title VI or
Title IX agency regulations, although without necessarily citing
Chevron. For instance, the Gebser Court examined and relied on
Department of Education regulations mandating that school districts
should be subject to funding termination only when they have clear
notice of inappropriate harassing behavior, but fail to take action to
404
correct that behavior. Similarly, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, the Court positively cited OCR guidelines that notified
school districts when they could be liable for certain types of
405
behavior, including sexual harassment under Title IX.
The Court
observed that the OCR guidelines placed school districts on notice
that they might incur liability if they ignored student-on-student
406
harassment.
Although neither case cited Chevron, both Gebser and
Davis implied that an agency’s interpretation of Title IX or Title VI
deserves some deference when defining actionable forms of
407
discrimination.
C. The Core Antidiscrimination Principles in Both Title VI and Title
IX Support a Private Right of Action Against Retaliation Based on
Allegations of Intentional Discrimination
To effectuate § 601 and § 901’s core prohibitions against
intentional discrimination, courts should recognize an implied right
of action for plaintiffs who allege that their employer or school has
retaliated against them for protesting intentional discrimination.
Such a right of action is consistent with Congress’ central purpose of
408
barring intentional discrimination under both Title VI and Title IX.
Accordingly, courts may find that Titles VI and IX implicitly allow
plaintiffs who complain about intentional discrimination to bring
retaliation claims because such suits are substantially consistent with
those statutes’ primary purpose of prohibiting recipients from
404

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92 (“The administrative regulations . . . prohibit[ ]
commencement of enforcement proceedings until the agency has determined that
voluntary compliance is unobtainable and the recipient . . . has been notified of its
failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Black, supra note 2, at 362; Joslin, supra note 112,
at 209-10.
405
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, 643-44, 647-48 (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP’T OF
EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039-40 (Mar.
13, 1997)); see also Black, supra note 2, at 362-63.
406
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48; see also Black, supra note 2, at 363.
407
See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also
Black, supra note 2, at 362-63; Joslin, supra note 112, at 209-10.
408
See supra notes 22-23, 334-35, 361-63 and accompanying text.
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409

engaging in intentional discrimination.

409

393.

See supra text accompanying notes 22-23, 32-34, 40-41, 213, 334-45, 354, 361-63,

